COMMENTS

"NUNCA MAIS!" HOW CURRENT EUROPEAN
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION
REGIMES ARE ADDRESSING THE PRESTIGE
OIL SPILL OF 2002
ICIAR PATRICIA GARCIA*

Three years after the public outcry and political pressure that
ensued when the single-hulled tanker Erika ran aground off the
coast of Brittany, the post-Erika Europe, which legislators had so
confidently envisioned in 2000, unraveled at the seams. On November 19, 2002, the single-hulled tanker Prestige broke in half approximately 170 miles off the coast of northwest Spain,' leaving a
damaging trail of three million gallons of Russian fuel oil.2 The
catastrophic spill revealed the utter failure of the pre-emptive
measures enacted post-Erika to ensure that Europe would never
again have to face an environmental disaster of such devastating
proportions.
The Prestige would become the region's second catastrophic oil
spill in less than a decade, almost ten years to the day after the oil
tanker Aegean Sea3 smashed into La Cortfia, Spain's main port city
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, University of Pennsylvania Law School. The Author
would like to thank all those who made this Comment possible: Maria SmolkaDay and Ron Day for their tireless efforts in locating sources; Vincenzo Lucibello
for his generous research assistance and infinite patience; Massiel Garcia for her
constant moral support; and especially the Author's parents, Jose and Maria, who
are the inspiration for this work.
1 Eric R. Jaworski, Comment, Developments in Vessel-Based Pollution:Prestige
Oil Catastrophe Threatens West European Coastline, Spurs Europe To Take Action
Against Aging and Unsafe Tankers, 2002 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 101,101-02.
2 Bhushan Bahree et al., Distress Signal: Clash of Politics, Economics Sealed a
Tanker's Fate, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 2002, at Al.
3 The Greek ship Aegean Sea ran aground in La Corufia harbor on December
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in the northwest region of Galicia. Something had gone terribly
wrong, and the various European regulatory organizations were
left scrambling to understand what had happened amidst the finger pointing that ensued.
The aftermath of the Prestige incident defined the disaster:
crippled tourism as beaches along the Galician coast were closed
indefinitely, devastated fisheries grounded on shore, panicked unemployment, an expensive clean-up effort, and damages expected
to exceed El billion. 4 Determining who was at fault appeared to be
impossible. The aging, hulled tanker had been manufactured in
Japan, but was owned by a Greek company registered in Liberia; it
sailed under a Bahamian flag, but was operated by a Greek crew
and was transporting Russian oil owned by Swiss-based Russian
commodities traders. 5 There were claims that British customs
agents and the American classification society hired to determine
the tanker's seaworthiness had failed to conduct adequate safety
inspections. 6 Many, however, were blaming the Spanish government for their uncoordinated response to the emergency, and for
refusing the vessel access to a port where salvage crews may have
been able to contain the spill. This was the more sinister backdrop
to the victims' cries of "Nunca Mdis!"- never again. But this was
exactly what legislators had hoped to ensure after the Erika disaster
three years before, and the demand appeared to have fallen on
deaf ears.
The European Union ("EU") and its administrative bodies have
3, 1992. The ship was carrying approximately 80,000 tons of crude oil, most of
which was either spilled into the ocean or consumed by the fire that broke out on
board after the vessel grounded. COLIN DE LA RUE & CHARLES B. ANDERSON,
SHIPPING AND THE ENVIRONMENT: LAW AND PRACTICE 72 (1998).
4 International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds, The Prestige IncidentSpain, 13 November 2002 [hereinafter
IOPC Prestige
Report],
at
http://www.iopcfund.org/prestige (last updated Nov. 11, 2004).
5 See Marc Roche, L'affriteur russe du <Prestig>es'est mis ail'abrides poursuites
[The Russian Freighterof the Prestige Has Sheltered Itself from Legal Proceedings], LE
MONDE, Jan. 7, 2003, at 12 (discussing how the Russian conglomerate, Alpha, has
separated from its trading subsidiary, Crown Resources, proprietor of the sunken
cargo).
6 See John McLaughlin, United States: Houston Go-Ahead to Basque Government
for ABS Action, LLOYD'S LIST, Nov. 5, 2003, at 5 (discussing a lawsuit filed by
Basque government entities charging the American Bureau of Shipping ("ABS")
with "negligence, and gross negligence, alleging that [ABS] breached its duty of
care 'by failing to perform an adequate inspection of the Prestige, and by classifying [the Prestige] as seaworthy, when the vessel simply was not."'), available at
LEXIS, News Library, Lloyd's List File.
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instituted a series of fairly successful maritime regulations to govern the safety and protection of marine environments in the transport of hazardous cargo. However, stricter liability schemes are
needed to identify where best to allocate fault in the event of marine casualties, and to provide greater incentives to force delinquent parties-be they individuals or States-to adhere to current
convention standards. The Prestige spill, occurring so soon after
the Erika, highlights the relative incompetence of the current liability and compensation regime, which caps the liability of ship owners and industry operators thereby shifting the brunt of economic
loss onto affected individuals and coastal states. Moreover, the
calculation of damages, which under the current compensation
scheme excludes most of the environmental damage caused by oil
spills, should incorporate environmental loss. This inclusion is
particularly necessary in affected areas where harm to biodiversity
can seriously affect the regional economy.
Section 1 of this Comment will recount the events leading up to
the demise of the Prestige, taking care to detail the conduct of Spain
and Portugal in responding to the emergency. It will also look at
the aftermath of the oil spill, focusing on the harm sustained by regional marine and wildlife, as well as the effect of the spill on the
Galician economy.
Section 2 of the Comment will detail the various parties involved so as to address their respective potential liabilities.
This analysis will be furthered by the theoretical context provided in Section 3, which will concentrate on the maritime conventions that form the regulatory background of the current liability
and compensation regime, paying close attention to the evolution
of port state control and post-Erika regulation.
Section 4 of the Comment will consider the current liability and
compensation regime, focusing on the availability of compensation
funds and the distribution of indemnities.
Finally, Section 5 of the Comment will consider what the international community can do to prevent future Prestige-like incidents. While the focus of the Community's efforts is now on
eliminating these high-risk tankers, it is more important that
coastal states increase investment in creating a coordinated plan for
emergency response while these high risk single and double-hulled
tankers continue to sail through vulnerable coastal zones.
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1. THE OIL SPILL AND ITS EFFECTS
1.1. Anatomy of a Disaster: The Saga of the Prestige
On November 13, 2002, the single-hulled oil tanker Prestige,
carrying 77,000 tons of fuel oil 7 valued at $10 million, stalled off the
coast of northwest Spain and leaked an expanding slick of oil from
its badly fractured hull. 8 Two weeks prior, it had left St. Petersburg, Russia where, since July, the twenty-six year old tanker had
been serving as a makeshift oil storage facility. After filling up
with cargo in Ventspils, Latvia, the Prestige set sail for Singapore.
The tanker was making its way south along the Atlantic when the
crew noticed that the hull was damaged.
When the crew finally sent a mayday to the Spanish coast
guard, the Prestige was only twenty-seven miles from the coast of
Galicia, battling twenty-foot waves and gale force winds that were
causing the vessel to list precariously. 9 Helicopters evacuated the
Prestige's crew, leaving the tanker's Greek captain Opostolos
Mangouras, the first officer, and the chief mechanic on board as
they tried to rescue the failing ship. By the time the Spanish tugboat Ria de Vigo reached the floundering tanker an hour later, the
Prestige was already surrounded by an oil slick more than a mile
across in diameter. 10
Meanwhile, in Galicia's main port city of La Corufia, the Spanish salvage company Technosub International Inc. had learned
from its partner in Rotterdam, SMIT Salvage NV ("SMIT"), that it
won the contract to attempt a rescue of the Prestige." By the morning of November 14, the Prestige, its engines dead, had drifted
within three miles of land. The Ria de Vigo had been unable to
keep the tanker out at sea because the cables used to keep the Prestige under control were snapped by the intense pressure of the
7 De Palacio urge a Quince a aplicar ya las nuevas normas seguridad [De Palacio
Urges Member States to Apply the New Security Norms], EFE NEWS SERVICES, Nov. 19,
2002 [hereinafter De Palacio], available at LEXIS, News Library, Spanish Newswire
Services File.
8 Bahree, supra note 2, at Al.
9 Id. at A12.
10 Id.

11 If the ship and its cargo could be salvaged, SMIT and Technosub could
make millions of dollars. Id.; see PATRICIA BIRNIE & ALAN BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 381-82 (2d ed. 2002) (noting that salvagers work on
speculation and receive "special compensation" for successful salvage operations).
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waves.
Despite the cable problems, the Prestige was stable enough to
allow Spanish coast guard technicians and an inspector from the
harbor master's office in Corufia to board the ship and assess its
damage. After listening to their assessment, Jose Luis L6pez Sors,
director-general of Spain's merchant marines, demanded that the
vessel be towed at least 120 miles away from the Galician coast.
He dispatched the warship Catalufia to ensure his orders would be
obeyed.1 2 By the time SMIT's deputy chief executive, Geert Koffeman, arrived in La Corufia, the Prestige had already been towed
an oil slick
twenty-five miles out into the Atlantic Ocean leaving
3
wake.'
its
in
wide
yards
200
and
long
miles
twenty
Braving bad weather and twelve-foot-high waves, SMIT's chief
salvage master, Wytse Huismans, and his team of rescuers were
lowered onto the Prestige to commence rescue efforts. After assessing the damage, they telephoned Koffeman in Corufia with the
message that the only hope of salvaging the tanker involved bringing it into the relatively peaceful water of La Corufia Bay where
they could pump its cargo into another vessel. It was an operation
14
that SMIT claimed to have performed many times before. Koffeman knew that the ship would break up if it was towed farther out
to sea,' 5 so he set up a meeting with Spanish officials to discuss
SMITS' recommendation. The Spaniards flatly rejected the idea.
Ultimately, SMIT made the decision to tow the Prestige to the Cape
Verde islands, more than 2,000 miles away. 16 That evening,
Mangouras radioed the coast guard that he and the remaining
crew had to be evacuated from the ship immediately. When
Mangouras arrived at the airport in La Corufia, Spanish authorities
17
arrested him on several charges.
Early on November 16, the oil slick, aided by strong winds,
broke through the floating barriers laid out to keep it in check; oil
Bahree, supranote 2, at A12.
"France, Britain and the Netherlands sent antipollution equipment, including nearly five miles of floating barriers, to help Spain contain the mess." Id.
14 Id.
15 See Questions Grow Over Culpability in Tanker Sinking, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21,
2002, at A14 (quoting Koffeman as stating that the tanker would not have broken
up if it had not been forced out into the rough waters of the Atlantic).
16 Bahree, supra note 2, at A12.
Id.; see also London Club Posts Bail For Prestige Master, MARITIME LONDON,
17
Feb. 17, 2003 (reporting that Mangouras was charged with not cooperating with
Spanish authorities), at http://www.maritimelondon.com/london-matters/
17february03_main.shtml#new (last visited Oct. 21, 2004).
12
13
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and poisoned fauna began washing up on La Corufia's shores. 18
Moreover, a large piece of the Prestige's deck plating, forty yards
tall and ten yards wide, broke off.' 9 Then, shortly before midnight
on November 17, the Portuguese warship Jodo Coutinho approached the salvage team with explicit orders that the tugboats
were not to bring the damaged tanker within two hundred miles of
the Portuguese coast.20 To comply, the salvage team had to change
course and head farther west into even rougher seas. 21 After being
battered by fierce waves for another thirty hours, the tanker finally
began breaking apart. By 9:30 a.m. on November 19, the tanker's
two parts were at a forty-five degree angle.22 The Spanish Minister
of Defense, Federico Trillo, considered sending F-18 fighter jets to
bomb the tanker and set its cargo on fire so that the oil would be
burned off, but he scrapped the idea after deeming the maneuver
too risky.23 Finally, at 4:15 p.m., the Prestige sank 133 miles west of
Spain and Portugal in a marine preserve known as the Galicia
Bank. 24 At the time, the condition of the submerged cargo was unknown, believed to have solidified under extreme pressures and
frigid temperatures; but the fear persisted that the tanks would
eventually rupture and that the oil would rise to the surface. 25
Bahree, supranote 2, at A12.
Id.
20 See Naufragio del 'Prestige'/La Catdstrofe Medioambiental: "Aun hay fugas," dice
Francia [The Prestige Shipwreck/The Environmental Catastrophe: "There Are Still
Leaks," Says France],EL MUNDO, Nov. 28, 2002, at 9 ("Los remolcadores holandeses
.*. fueron obligados a cambiar de direcci6n de manera brusca siguiendo ordenes
del buque de guerra luso JoAo Coutinho .... Por este motivo... el Prestige tuvo
que navegar en sentido perpendicular a las olas y quedo atrapado entre dos corrientes." ["The Dutch salvage crew ... was forced to change direction brusquely by
order of the Portuguese warship JoAo Coutinho ....
Because of this ... the Prestige had to navigate perpendicular to the waves and became trapped between two
currents."]).
21 Id. But see Begofia Perez, Naufragio del 'Prestige':Portugaldesmiente a 'Stem'
[The Prestige Disaster:PortugalDenies Stem's Allegations], EL MuNDO, Nov. 29, 2002,
at 16 (denying allegations that Portugal was responsible for the demise of the Prestige by forcing it to make an abrupt turn out to rougher seas).
22 Bahree, supra note 2, at A12.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 See Sucesos-Petrolero: Fomento Preve Que el Fuel Contiene Buque Hundido se
Solidificara [Events-Tanker: Department of Promotion Predicts That Fuel Contained in
Sunken Ship Will Solidify], EFE NEWS SERVICES, Nov. 19, 2002 [hereinafter SucesosPetrolero], availableat LEXIS, News Library, Spanish News Services File ("El Ministerio de Fomento . .. apunto que . .. el fuel que [el Prestigio] contiene podria
solidificarse debido a la baja temperatura del agua." ["The Department of Promotion. . . noted that ... the fuel contained in [the Prestige] may solidify due to the
18
19

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss4/4

ADDRESSING THE PRESTIGE OIL SPILL

2004]

1401

While salvage crews relinquished responsibility and the Spanish government scrambled to sift though the morass of parties involved to determine who was liable-and more importantly, who
would pay for damages-four large oil slicks made their way towards the Spanish coast.
1.2. The Aftermath of a Disaster
1.2.1. Amount of Oil Spilled
The six days of the Prestige crisis paled in comparison to the
public outrage that followed as more accurate data was made
available and the extent of the oil spill was more readily perceived.
The tanker carried 77,000 tons of fuel oil, roughly double the
amount the Exxon-Valdez was carrying in 1989.26 The initial
cleanup costs were estimated at £42-43 million.27 Some estimates
put the total cost of the disaster at £350 million. 28 Efforts at containing the spread of the oil slick were only marginally successful,
with tests confirming the presence of Prestige oil on French beaches
in early January 2003.29
With well over half of the tanker's cargo having gone down
with the ship, the environmental impact of the spilled oil has been
considerable. The vessel initially spilled 1.3 million gallons of oil
that has washed ashore the environmentally fragile region of
Galicia. 30 One week after the disaster, 240 tons were scraped off an
eighty kilometer stretch of coastline. 31 At first, environmentalists
law temperature of the water."]).
26 The Exxon-Valdez leaked forty-two million liters of oil and created a black
tide 250 square kilometers wide. Vertido Afecta 295km. Costa, a la que se Destinan 42
Millones [Oil Spill Affects 295km. of Coastline,for which 42 Million is Expected], EFE
NEWS SERVIcEs, Nov. 20, 2002 [hereinafter Vertido], available at LEXIS, News Library, Spanish Newswire Services File.
27 These costs supersede those of the Aegean Sea spill, when the Greek tanker
crashed into the rocky coast of La Corufia on December 3, 1992. La Crisis del Vertido de Petroleo: El Impacto Econ6mico [The Crisis of the Oil Spill: The Economic Impact],
RECOLETOS CIA EDITORIAL EXPANSION, Nov. 27, 2002 [hereinafter La Crisis], available
at LEXIS, News Library, Spanish Newswire Services File.
28

Id.

Jaworski, supra note 1, at 103.
It is believed that between 1.3 million and 2.6 million gallons of fuel oil
leaked on November 13, 2002. European Space Agency, Galicia (Spain) Oil Spill,
from November 2002 to April 2003, at http://earth.esa.int/ew/oil-slicks/galicia
_sp_02 (last visited Nov. 8, 2004).
31 John Whitfield, Uncertainty Shrouds Prestige Tanker Spill, NATuRE, Nov. 23,
4
2002, at http://www.nature.com/nsu/021118/021118-1 .html (last visited Oct.
29

30
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believed that the stern compartments holding the remaining oil
were intact when the tanker sank to the bottom of the Atlantic
Ocean, and that the highly viscous cargo would solidify and stay in
the tanks, temporarily assuaging fears of further ecological disaster. 32 When the single-hulled tanker Erika sank off the coast of Brittany in 1999, she took most of her oil cargo to the bottom of the sea
and her tanks seem to have stayed intact.33 But only a few weeks
after the Prestige sank, the French submarine Nautile34 discovered
oil leaking from fourteen cracks in the tanks, estimated to be discharging 125 tons35 each day. The Nautile's mission to plug the
holes was only a temporary solution, however, since the primary
concern was the long-term effects of the spill which will multiply
in magnitude as the ship rusts through and the oil is released.3 6
Ships have been known to cause pollution years after they have
sunk, 37 prodding SMIT spokesperson Daniel Yates to comment:
"[wie don't know if it's a dripping tap or a time bomb." 38
1.2.2. The Effect on the Environment
The Spanish Costa da Morte 39 is one of Spain's important fish11, 2004).
32 Sucesos-Petrolero,supra note 25.
33 Whitfield, supra note 31.
34 The Nautile miniature submarine, famous for diving to the sunken Titanic,
is owned by the French marine research institute Ifremer. It has been instrumental in assessing damage sustained by the sunken tanker. See Nautile: Miniature
Submarine, BBC NEWS WORLD EDITION, Dec. 2, 2002 (detailing the activities of the
submarine on the Prestige), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2536339.stm
(last visited Oct. 21, 2004).
35 John Whitfield, Prestige: One Month On, NATURE, Dec. 18, 2002, at
http://www.nature.com/nsu/021216/021216-6.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2003).
36 SMIT Salvage has submitted a report to the European Commission outlining the options for the Prestige, among which is using remote-controlled equipment to pump the oil out of the ship, which is located 2,600 meters beneath the sea
and 210 kilometers out to sea. Id.
37 For example, in 2001 a series of "mystery" oil slicks that had been washing
up on the California coastline during the 1990s was traced back to a freighter that
sank in 1953. Whitfield, supra note 31.
38 Whitfield, supra note 35. "Even if the cargo stays on the seabed, compressed and turned into a heavy, waxy substance by the cold and extreme pressures... heavy metals will still leach into the water and enter the food chain." Oil
Tanker DisasterDestroys Livelihoods in Spain, 7 DRILLBITS & TAILINGS 10 (Dec. 2002)
[hereinafter DRILLBITS], at http://www.moles.org/ProjectUnderground/drillbits/
7_10/ 2.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2004).
39 The "Coast of Death" is the name given to the northern coast of Galicia.
Historically, the name derives from the fact that, before the discovery of the
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ing areas, boasting "thirteen ecosystem types according to the EU's
habitats directive." 40 The rocky coast of Galicia is home to large
communities of shellfish and fish, including sea barnacles, which
are important to the regional fishing industry. The area of the oil
spill is also part of the wintering zone for many species of birds, including the Balearic shearwater and the endangered Iberian guillemot. 41 The sea here is so rich in fish that it serves as the feeding
ground for many seabirds and sea mammals, such as whales and
dolphins. Whereas light oil particularly affects fish, heavier oil like
the type transported on the Prestige poses a serious threat to shellfish, seabirds, and sea mammals. 42 Moreover, leaked oil can cause
a chain of contamination that is difficult to contain. 43 Since plankton are at the base of the marine food chain, any drop in their
numbers will adversely affect other marine creatures. Consequently, it is impossible to predict the full extent of the damage,
and some experts claim that environmental monitoring of the Pres44
tige incident will be necessary for the next five to ten years.
One month after the disaster, 3,000 dead or oil covered birds
had been found, but ornithologists warn that for every bird recovered, usually ten more have been damaged or killed at sea. 45 Due
to this unsettling fact, the Spanish Ornithological Society has
Americas, it was known to many Medieval Europeans as Finisterra,literally "the
end of the Earth." However, the area has since earned its unfortunate moniker for
being the site of countless shipwrecks. See Deputaci6n da Corufia, Historia y Tradiciones: Los Naufragios ("La mayoria de los estudiosos defienden que el origen de
este top6nimo hace alusi6n a las numerosas catistrofes marinas que aqui se produjeron." ["The majority of studies espouse the belief that the origin of the name
alludes to the numerous marine catastrophes that have occurred here."]), at
http://www.dicoruna.es/neria/naufragios-pl.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2004).
40 Jaworski, supra note 1, at 103.
41

See RAUIL GARCiA, WWF-SPAIN, THE PRESTIGE: ONE YEAR ON, A CONTINUING

DISASTER 10 (2003) (discussing the effect of the Prestige spill on marine birds and
mammals), at http://www.panda.org/downloads/marine/finalprestige.pdf (last
visited Nov. 8, 2004).
42 Thomas Hfer, Tanker Safety and Coastal Environment: Prestige, Erika, and
What Else?, 10 ENvTL. SCI. & POLLUTION RES. 1, 2 (2003), availableat http://www.
scientificjournals.com/sj/espr/Pdf/ald/5616 (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
43 Fish will also consume the toxic oil and pass it on to porpoises, dolphins,
birds, and even humans. Whitfield, supra note 31.
44 While some scientists believe that the ecosystem will have recovered when
all the parts are functioning again, others argue that the impact will last for decades. See H~fer, supra note 42 (describing the repercussions of the Prestigeoil spill,
including the economic cost and social effects).
45 "It's one of the worst spills ever," remarked Simon Cripps of the Worldwide Fund for Nature's Endangered Seas Programme. Whitfield, supra note 35.
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claimed that one endangered species, the Iberian guillemot, should
be considered extinct. 46 Rescue efforts of these and other birds are
hampered by the rugged Galician coastline, with its numerous inaccessible beaches, making it difficult to find birds and accurately
determine how large the effect has been on marine wildlife. 47
1.2.3. The Effect on Galician Economy
In assessing the damage done to the environmental economy,
all losses to the region's welfare are considered. This includes the
obvious costs of cleaning and restoration of areas affected by the
spill, which are typically paid with public funds. But the people
who make their living directly from the contaminated resourcenamely, the sectors of fishing, shellfish harvesting, agriculture and
tourism -suffer the more substantial damage. 48
When it was discovered that oil was leaking out of the tanker,
the Spanish authorities ordered a temporary halt to fishing in an
area that was enlarged within the following weeks. This required
thousands of fishing vessels to stay in harbor, affecting a work
force of up to 6,000 fisherman and shellfish harvest personnel 49 and
an enterprise worth more than $300 million per year.5 0 "This coastline is also home to one of the world's largest aquaculture of mussels," making it a prime area to fisheries of many nations.5 1
The fishing industry is regarded as the key motor of the
Galician economy, generating profits of more than C2.4 billion
yearly, and upon which over seventy other sectors of the Galician
economy directly depend. It employs approximately 30,000 laborers, which represents forty percent of the Spanish labor force.5 2
46 Only twenty-five pairs of the birds live on the now oil-slick Galician coast,
leading ornithologists to believe that if any survive, it is doubtful they will find
nesting sites and food in the upcoming years. Jaworski, supra note 1, at 103-04.
47 Whitfield, supra note 31.
48 Tourism is considered to be a key developing industry in the region, attracting approximately 4,778,000 tourists in 2001 and reaping profits of E2.7 billion. See Xunta de Galicia, Galicia 2003: Turismo [Galicia 2003: Tourism] (detailing
the year in review for Galician tourism), at http://www.xunta.es/galicia2003/es/
15_01.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2004).
49 Hofer, supra note 42, at 2.
50 DRILLBITS, supra note 38, para. 2.
51 Hofer explains that hazards of the oil spill include not only the chemical
contamination of seafood, but also the tainting of the fuel oil, which strongly influences the taste and smell of fish. Hofer, supra note 42, at 2.
52 See Xunta de Galicia, Galicia 2003: Polftica Pesquera [Galicia2003: Fishing Industry] (detailing the year in review for the Galician fishing industry), at

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss4/4

2004]

ADDRESSING THE PRESTIGE OIL SPILL

1405

Facing rampant unemployment and economic disaster in a region
that was already among the poorest in Europe, the Spanish Congress unanimously approved a monthly indemnity of E1,200 for six
months to be made available to the affected fishermen and fishery
owners.5 3 The Royal Decree granting the allowances also included
a reduction in taxes for the economic activities and rents assumed
by the affected fishermen and shellfish harvesters. 54 On June 5,
2004, the new Socialist government announced that it would approve the creation of a €160 million relief fund for the affected fishermen and that the Cabinet would alter Royal Decree 4/2003,
which indemnified fishermen in exchange for foregoing future
lawsuits.55 Additionally, the government made aid available to affected coastal municipalities that demonstrated substantial dam56
ages to their local economies.
Initial clean-up costs were estimated to be £42 million.5 7 But in
the 1999 Erika case, the damage amounted to E840 million, and the
fishery and shellfish sector of the area where the tanker floundered
is not comparable to that of Galicia. 58 Nearly two months after the
http://www.xunta.es/galicia2003/es/22.01.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2004).
53 The national funds offered credits totaling E100 million. Hbfer, supra note
42, at 2; see also Pilar Marcos, El Gobierno Extiende las Ayudas Directas y los Beneficios
Fiscalesa Nuevos Afectados [The Government Extends Direct Aid and Economic Benefits
to New Victims], EL PAIS (Andalucia), Dec. 8, 2002, at 22 (listing the types of aid
made available to affected fishermen, fishing boat owners, shellfish harvestors,
and ancillary industries), availableat LEXIS, News Library, El Pais File.
54 The Xunta, Galicia's regional autonomous government, also demanded the
extension of similar aid to the canning industry, which is responsible for the employment of approximately 18,000 Gallegos, many of whom are women. See La
Industria Conservera Reclama a Aznar ser Incluida en el Paquete de Ayudas [Canning
Industry Demands That They Be Included in Aid Package], RECOLETOS CIA EDITORIAL
EXPANSION (Madrid), Dec. 12, 2002 (recounting the demands made by the National
Association of Preserve Manufacturers of Fish and Shellfish to extend government
aid to correlative sectors of the fishing industry in Galicia), available at LEXIS,
News Library, Spanish Newswire File.
55 Brett Allan King, Spain Announces New CompensationRules, Start of Oil Extraction From Sunken Tanker, 27 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 463 (June 16,
2004).
56 By December 1, 2002, there were seventy affected municipalities which the
Spanish government had pledged to help. Id.
57 See Crece Preocupaci6nPor Avance Vertidos Que Afectan 295 kilometros [Worry
Grows Over Oil Spill That Affects 295 Kilometers], EFE NEWS SERVICES, Nov. 20, 2002
(basing estimated damages on the 295 kilometers long affected coastline, home to
forty beaches, which totals an area of approximately 1.5 million square meters in
need of regeneration), available at LEXIS, News Library, Spanish Newswire Services File.
58 See Maria Xos6 Vizquez et al., Economic Effects of the Catastropheof the Prestige: An Advance (Jan. 2003), at 3 (comparing the economic harm sustained by the
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Prestige disaster, some experts recalculated the cost of the clean-up
to be E1 billion.59 On December 11, the Minister of the Environment, Jaume Matas, announced that Spain would include estimated monetary damages caused to its ecosystems in its demands
for indemnity to responsible parties. 60 As it stands, the International Fund for Compensation of Damages Caused by Hydrocarbon Contamination ("FIDAC") limits biodiversity damages to two
61
years.
2. UNRAVELING THE PRESTIGE: WHO IS LIABLE?
The sinking of the Prestige and consequent oil spill were nothing compared to the truly messy task of determining who was to
blame, and, more importantly, who was to pay. The Prestige case,
in this sense, is a truly international affair. The tanker was built in
1976 by a Japanese shipbuilding company.62 The oil tanker itself
was owned by the Greek company Mare Shipping, a limited liability company registered in Liberia, 63 and managed by Universe
Maritime Ltd., which is controlled by Efi MoulopoulosCoulouthros, heiress to the Greek shipping dynasty. 64 It was piGalician fishing and tourism sectors to that caused by the Erika and Exxon-Valdez
spills), at http:/ / otvm.uvigo.es/ investigacion/ informes/ documentos/archivos/
Prestige_Introduccion.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2003).
59 Id. (stating cleanup costs have reached C1 billion).
60 The estimation will be calculated using models developed in Spanish universities that derive the economic valuation of environmental resources. See
Espafia Incluird los Dafios a Ecosistema en la Facturadel Desastre [Spain Will Include
Damage to the Ecosystem in the Disaster's Bill], EFE NEWS SERVICES, Dec. 11, 2002
[hereinafter Ecosistema] (discussing the inclusion of biodiversity damages to demands for indemnity), available at LEXIS, News Library, Spanish Newswire Services File. The evaluation of damages caused by the Exxon-Valdez oil spill in 1989
was a pioneer in including the loss of biodiversity in the estimation of damages.
See Vdzquez, supra note 58, at 4 (discussing the inclusion of losses to public benefit
and natural heritage in damage calculations).
61 Dos Fondos de Compensaci6n Para Resarcir los Dafios Ecol6gicos [Two Compensation Funds To Reimburse Ecological Damage], CINco DfAS, Nov. 19, 2002, at 10 (discussing the availability of the International Fund for Compensation of Damages
Caused by Hydrocarbon Contamination ("FIDAC") and the London Convention
on Civil Responsibility as two sources of compensation for damages to biodiversity).
62 Press Release, American Bureau of Shipping ("ABS"), Prestige Casualty Information Update No. 3 (Nov. 20, 2002) [hereinafter ABS Press Release, Nov. 20,
2002], available at http://www.eagle.org/news/press/nov202002.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
63 Id.
64 Marc Roche & Martine Picouet, Enregistrie au Liberia, la Compagnie Propriftaire du "Prestige" Devrait Fchappera la Justice [Registered in Liberia, the Proprie-
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loted by a Greek crew and under the command of a Greek captain.
It was inspected by the classification society American Bureau of
Shipping ("ABS"), a non-profit, self-regulating agency headquartered in Houston, Texas.65 Additionally, the tanker was registered
under the flag of the Bahamas, well known as a "flag of conven66
ience" because of the Bahamas' lax registration requirements.
The Prestige was insured by the London Steamship Owners' Mutual Association, also known as the London Protection and Indemnity ("P&I") Club. 67 Crown Resources, a Russian owned commodities trading company based in Switzerland, owned the Prestige's
fuel oil cargo. 68 Crown Resources subsequently separated from
Alfa, its Russian parent company, and reorganized under the name
69
ERC Trading.
How does one determine liability under this web of ownership
and responsibility? Some argue that the ship owner should be held
personally liable, or at the very least, the ship's crew should be
blamed. In fact, it was the tanker's insurers, the London P&I Club,
which posted the E3 million bail to free Captain Mangouras from a
Spanish jail detaining him on charges of failing to cooperate with
Spanish authorities during the casualty. 70 The Spanish government
is actively pursuing claims against all three parties, 71 and has also
tors of the PrestigeWill Likely Escape Justice], LE MONDE, Feb. 5, 2003, at 13.
6
5ABS, ABS Company Overview, at http://www.eagle.org/company/over
view.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
66 The International Transport Workers' Federation, Flags of Convenience Campaign Report 2001/02 § 5 [hereinafter FOC Report], at http://www.itf.org.uk/
itfweb/seafarers/foc/report_2001/pages/s05-01.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2004).
67 For more information on protection and indemnity ("P&I") clubs, see generally P&I CLUBS: LAW AND PRACTICE (Steven J. Hazelwood ed., 3d ed. 2000) (discussing legislative developments with respect to P&I clubs as well as treatment of
risk and legality of indemnity insurance); DE LA RUE & ANDERSON, supra note 3, at
697-721 (discussing the liabilities of P&I Clubs and other liability insurers);
Charles Fleming, Spanish Spill to Get Damage Funds - Insurers, Industry Entity To
Pay Out 180 Million Euros; More May Be Hard To Win, WALL ST. J. (Europe), Nov.
21, 2002, at A10 (discussing damage payments from insurers and existing oilindustry funds with the suggestion that further payments would be difficult to
win).
68 See Roche, supra note 5 (discussing the separation of Crown Resources
from its Russian parent company Alfa, and its reorganization into ERC Trading).
69 Id.

London Club Posts Bail For Prestige Master,supra note 17.
In the case of the London P&I Club, Spain wishes to recover the full
amount for which the Prestige was insured, after the Club announced that it
would only pay approximately €26 million. See Fleming, supra note 67, at A10 ("It
doesn't look like we'll be paying more than $26 million.").
70
71
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pursued ABS in the U.S. court system. 72 Other groups, in turn, are
claiming that the Spanish and Portuguese governments are at fault
73
for acting recklessly in failing to aid the salvage efforts.
Under current international agreements, an internationally
managed compensation scheme governs civil liability. The International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund ("IOPC")74, in conjunction with the ship's insurers, can pay up to £180 million.75 If the
costs or compensation claims exceed that figure, then claimants
have to resort to legal action to recover damages. But before delving into the liability compensation scheme, it would be helpful to
look at the relevant maritime law and conventions that provide the
theoretical framework for such a liability regime.
3. BEGINNING TO ASSESS RESPONSIBILITY: RELEVANT LAW

In order to adequately discuss liability regimes, it is helpful to
consider the relevant law that guides the protection of marine environments. The 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment and the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and Development were substantial impetus for developing new law in the
regulation of marine environments. 76 Recommendations from the
Stockholm Conference directly led to the adoption of the 1973
MARPOL Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
("MARPOL').77
72 See McLaughlin, supra note 6 (describing a U.S. federal court's decision to
hear Basque entities' $50 million case against ABS for negligence and gross negligence in classifying the Prestige as seaworthy without an adequate inspection);
Michael Grey, Giant Stakes for Shipping in Spain's Fight with ABS, LLOYD'S LIST
INT'L, July 7, 2003, at 7 (commenting that the lawsuits ensuing from the Prestige
disaster are a battle that "ABS and the wider world of classification cannot afford
to lose"), available at LEXIS, News Library, Lloyd's List File.
73 See Press Release, ABS, ABS Fires Back at Spanish Government over Prestige Claims (June30, 2003) [hereinafter ABS Press Release, June 30, 20031 (responding to the Spanish Government's suit seeking $700 million in damages by counterclaiming for recovery against any claims made), at http://www.eagle.org/news/
press/june30.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2004); Greenpeace, One Year On: Spectre of
'Prestige' Still Haunts Europe (Nov. 10, 2003) (criticizing Spain's response to the calamity and claiming that it should be held responsible), at http://
eu.greenpeace.org/downloads/envlia/PRonOneYearAfterPrestige-E.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2004).
74 See discussion infra Section 4.3.
75 See Fleming, supra note 67, at A10 (suggesting that obtaining up to E180
million from the insurers and the oil fund is feasible).
76 BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 11, at 348.
77 Id.
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The 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS
III")78 was intended to be a comprehensive restatement of all the
aspects of maritime law. The convention codified the most important provision of maritime laws in Article 192, which establishes
that "States have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine
environment." 79 The articles of the UNCLOS III have effected a
number of fundamental changes in the international law of the sea.
Namely, these changes are that pollution can no longer be regarded as an implicit freedom of the seas, that the balance of
power between flag states and coastal states must be readjusted,
and perhaps, the most problematic in the case of the Prestige, that
emphasis is no longer placed on responsibility or liability for environmental damage.8 0 Instead, the emphasis rests primarily on international regulation and cooperation for the protection of the
8
marine environment. '
The purpose of regulating pollution from ships is to minimize
risk and give coastal states adequate means of protecting themselves and securing compensation for spill damage. A main theme
of UNCLOS III was "the failure of the traditional structure of jurisdiction over ships and maritime areas to protect the interests of the
coastal states whose proximity to shipping routes made them particularly vulnerable." 82 While the duty of the flag state to adopt
and enforce safety regulations was inadequately defined and rarely
observed, the authority of the coastal state to regulate activities off
its coast was entirely too restricted. 83 MARPOL and UNCLOS III
responded to these problems by increasing the power of coastal
and port states and by redefining and heightening flag states' re84
sponsibilities to safeguard the marine environment.
Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 387, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS
III], availableat http://w-ww.un.org/depts/los/convention agreements/texts/
unclos/UNCLOS-TOC.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2004).
79 PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN BOYLE, BASIC DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 154 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1995). Stronger expressed
obligations to protect the marine environment emerged in other multilateral
agreements negotiated since 1954, including the 1972 London Dumping Convention and the 1973/78 MARPOL Conventions. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 11, at
351.
80 BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 11, at 360.
78

81
82
83
84

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. For example, even when a ship is within the territorial jurisdiction of
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Flag state responsibility has been the subject of more specific
international agreements to provide internationally recognized
common standards for flag states and coastal states in regulating
the safety of shipping. For example, an important 1974 Convention
of Safety of Life at Sea ("SOLAS")85 amendment that came into
force in 1998 made it mandatory for all oil and chemical tankers to
comply with the International Maritime Organization's ("IMO")86
Code on International Safety Management ("ISM Code"). 87 Thus,
the IMO acts as the main regulatory and supervisory institution
that enforces these agreements, which results in a form of international regulation on environmental risk.
3.1. The 1973/78 MARPOL Convention
MARPOL effectively replaced the 1954 London Convention,
which was the first effective attempt at international oversight of
oil pollution from tankers.8 8 The convention articles8 9 mainly concern jurisdiction, powers of enforcement, and inspection, while the
more detailed anti-pollution regulations are contained in the annexes. 90 The parties to MARPOL in 2000 comprised over ninetyfour percent of merchant tonnage, which makes Annexes I and II
of the convention 91 part of the generally accepted standards preanother state, the state of the flag under which the ship sails retains exclusive jurisdiction. Id. at 361; see also BRIAN D. SMITH, STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MARINE
ENVIRONMENT: THE RULES OF DECISION 152 (1988) ("[AlIthough it may be concurrent with that of the coastal state, the prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction of
the flag on board the vessel remains intact in any location.").
85 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, opened for signature
Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, 1184 U.N.T.S. 276 (entered into force May 25, 1980)
[hereinafter SOLAS].
86 The International Maritime Organization ("IMO") is a specialized agency
of the United Nations concerned with developing international treaties and legislation regarding safety and marine pollution prevention. Z. Oya Ozqayir, Flags of
Convenience and the Need for International Cooperation, 7 INT'L MAR. L.J. 111 (2000),
availableat http://www.turkishpilots.org/DOCUMENTS/OyaOzcayirFlagsOf
_Convenience.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
87 BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 11, at 361.
88 Id. at 362.
89 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov.
2, 1973, 1340 U.N.T.S. 184, 12 I.L.M. 1319, as amended by Protocol of 1978 Relating
to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Feb.
17, 1978, 1340 U.N.T.S. 61, 17 I.L.M. 546 [hereinafter MARPOL 73/78].
90 BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 11, at 362.
91 All parties to MARPOL 73/78 are bound by Annexes I and II. See BIRNIE &
BOYLE, supra note 11, at 363 (noting that participation in the other annexes is optional and varies widely).
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scribed by Article 211 of UNCLOS III as the minimum requirement92
of the flag state's duty to exercise diligent control of its vessels.
MARPOL also set new stringent construction, design, equipment,
in 1992
and manning ("CDEM")93 standards, which were amended
94
disaster.
Exxon-Valdez
the
after
to require double hulls
Additionally, MARPOL instituted a more effective scheme of
enforcement in response to pressure from dissatisfied coastal
states. The new scheme involved the "cooperation of coastal states,
port states, and flag states in a system of certification, inspection,
and reporting." 95 The scheme aimed to make the operation of defective vessels difficult or impossible, and to aid the performance
96
of flag states in prosecuting and enforcing applicable laws.
The flag state has two main responsibilities under MARPOL:
1) it must inspect the vessel at periodic intervals to ensure seaworthiness; and 2) it must issue an international oil pollution certificate
ensuring that the ship complies with the requirements of
MARPOL. Port states may inspect ships holding these certificates. 97 Where noncompliance with a MARPOL certificate is revealed, port states must not allow such ships to sail. An efficient
scheme of port state inspection and control is therefore a more
practical means of deterring substandard vessels than flag state enforcement of international rules and standards, since these vessels
will more often come in contact with port states. 98 The cumulative
effect of MARPOL and SOLAS is that in a given year over 10,000

92 For more on the annexes of MARPOL 73/78, see Ruidiger Wolfrum et al.,
Preservationof the MarineEnvironment, in INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 225, 260-61 (Fred L. Morrison & Radiger Wolfrum eds.,
2000) (describing how the five annexes cover pollution by oil, various harmful
substances, and sewage from ships).
93 Construction, design, equipment, and manning ("CDEM") standards are
prescribed and most easily enforced by flag states as requirements for all vessels
seeking registration in their state. SMITH, supra note 84, at 150.
94
International Maritime Organization, MARPOL 73/78, available at
#25
http:/ /www.imo.org/Conventions/contents.asp?doc-id=678&topic-id=258
(last visited Oct. 31, 2004); see also infra note 138 and accompanying text.
95 BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 11, at 363.
96 Id. at 363-64.
97 Inspections may be carried out to confirm the possession of a valid certificate or to determine the condition of the ship. Id. at 364; see also discussion infra
Section 3.2.
98 Additionally, inspections can be conducted on vessels whose flag states are
non-parties to MARPOL 73/78 or SOLAS as a condition of port entry. BIRNIE &
BOYLE, supra note 11, at 365.
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ships sailing through Western Europe are inspected.99
But as the Prestige case and prior oil spill disasters indicate, the
problem of flag state implementation is a broader one than compliance with MARPOL alone. 100 While the IMO has been an active
regulatory body in securing acceptance for safety and environmental standards1 0' and in keeping abreast of new developments,
its supervisory role is nonetheless very weak. While the IMO can
set standards for flag states, "it has little power or incentive to po02
lice them."1
3.2. Coastal State Control under MARPOL
The coastal state's jurisdiction to regulate vessels depends on
its sovereignty over maritime zones contiguous to its coasts. Under MARPOL, any violation by a vessel within the jurisdiction of a
coastal state is punishable by the law of that state. 03 But beyond
that, coastal states are quite limited in their ability to enforce international safety and marine protection standards. A coastal state
cannot close its territorial waters to foreign ships in innocent passage even when their cargo poses significant environmental risk, as
in the case of oil tankers.1 04 At most, coastal states are entitled to
take certain precautionary measures to minimize the risk of pollution. These include observing special measures provided by
MARPOL or confining passage to specific sea lanes in the interests
of safety and the protection of environmentally sensitive areas.
Following the 1993 Braer spill off the Shetland Islands,105 the IMO
amended SOLAS to permit coastal states to obligate ships to report
their arrival to coastal authorities when entering designated
zones.106
99

Id.

See generally FOC Report, supra note 66 (detailing the status of flags-ofconvenience states in relation to the world's largest operating fleets).
101 BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 11, at 367.
100

102

Id.

Wolfrum, supra note 92, at 266.
Only prejudicial activities deny a vessel the right of innocent passage, not
passive characteristics such as CDEM. SMITH, supra note 84, at 201-02.
105 For more information on the Braer oil spill, see generally THE IMPACT OF AN
OIL SPILL IN TURBULENT WATERS: THE BRAER (.M. Davies & G. Topping eds., 1997)
(providing a "description of the impact of the Braer oil spill on both marine and
terrestrial life") and DE LA RuE & ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 72 (describing the
Braer oil spill and its environmental and economic impacts).
106 BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 11, at 371.
103
104
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However, coastal states are not bestowed with full jurisdiction
to enforce international regulations against ships that pass through
their exclusive economic zones ("EEZ"). 10 7 While customary law
permits coastal states to arrest ships engaged in illegal pollution or
dumping in the territorial sea, the practical exercise of the right
poses serious dangers to navigation and is therefore rarely used as
a means of enforcing anti-pollution regulations. Under the terms
of the 1969 IMO Convention Relating to Intervention on the High
Seas, 108 states are empowered to act against the ships of other countries which have been damaged if they pose a grave risk of oil pollution as a result. 10 9 The convention affirms the right of the coastal
state to take any measure that may be necessary to prevent, mitigate, or eliminate the danger to its coastline." 0 However, the
coastal state can only take action as is necessary,"' and any measures beyond those permitted by the convention may make the state
2
liable for any damages those measures might cause to the vessel."
This could explain the Spanish government's ultimate decision not
to bomb the Prestigeand burn its cargo. The strongest aspect of the
Id. at 375.
International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in
Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, Nov. 29, 1969, 26 U.S.T. 765, 970 U.N.T.S. 211
(entered into force May 6, 1975).
109 Wolfrum, supra note 92, at 266.
110 But see SMITH, supra note 84, at 244 ("EEZ prescriptive and enforcement
jurisdiction over [polluting conduct other than the dumping of wastes] ... is quite
restricted."); DE LA RUE & ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 903 ("The sole exception...
lies in the designation and control of special areas, but even here the coastal state
does not enjoy unrestricted freedom to enact unilateral laws.").
111 Yet, after the Amoco Cadiz spill in 1978, some states argued that the language of the 1969 Convention was too restrictive, and that intervention should be
allowed at an earlier stage. See BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 11, at 380 (noting that
while the 1969 Convention remains unchanged, Article 221 of UNCLOS III was
altered to allow coastal states the right of intervention when there is merely "actual or threatened damage").
112 See, e.g., BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 11, at 380 (pointing out that in the Torrey Canyon disaster of 1967, military aircrafts were employed to destroy the ship
and ignite the oil, and that these measures would likely not be considered justified
in handling present shipping casualties); see also SMITH, supra note 84, at 244 ("The
limited capacity to prevent afforded the coastal state seems to dictate the propriety of the simple due diligence standard in assessing coastal responsibility for
vessel conduct in the EEZ.").
107

108
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right of intervention provided by the convention is that it allows
coastal states, such as Spain and Portugal, to override the shipmaster's discretion in seeking salvage assistance and may permit them
13
to order damaged vessels away from their shores.
3.3. Port State Control
In short, the safer, more economic solution is to rely on port
states for the enforcement of international safety and environmental standards.
3.3.1. The 1982 ParisMemorandum of Understanding
In the EU, the regime governing port state control is based on
the 1982 Paris Memorandum of Understanding ("Paris MOU") and
114
the EC Directive on Port State Control of 1995 ("PSC-Directive").
The Paris MOU11 is not an international treaty, but rather an
agreement between participating states in order to effectively enforce international safety and environmental standards. In order to
do this, participating states commit themselves to: maintain an effective system of port state control; inspect at least twenty-five percent of all foreign merchant ships which enter their ports; and
lastly to "consult, cooperate and exchange information" with the
116
marine authorities of participating states.
The main achievement of the Paris MOU is the introduction of
innovative practices to enforce safety standards. These practices
include the targeting of certain ships with poor safety records or
that fly flags of convenience 1 7 in order to give priority to their inspection, and the publishing of "black lists" which identify high
risk flag states. Evidence from port state inspections demonstrates
that the greatest percentage of vessel deficiencies are represented
113

BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 11, at 380.

Doris Konig, PortState Control:An Assessment of European Practice,in MAR37, 39 (Peter Ehlers
et al. eds., 2002).
115 Paris Memorandum of Understanding of Port State Control [hereinafter
Paris MOU] (including the 26th Amendment and effective July 1, 2004), availableat
http://www.parismou.org/upload/pdf/26English.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2004).
116 Konig, supranote 114, at 40.
117 These are the flags of states that impose limited or no requirements in nationals' participation in ownership or manning of registered vessels. Their notoriously lax registration requirements make vessels flying these flags high risk due
to a lack of supervision. See SMITH, supra note 84, at 149 (discussing the call for a
"genuine link" between the state and the ship when controversial flags of convenience emerged after World War II).
114

INE IssuEs: FROM A SCIENTIFIC, POLITICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVE
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by ships flying under flags of convenience from countries like the
Bahamas, Liberia," 8 Cyprus, and Malta. 119 The Paris MOU attempts to circumvent the problem of limited manpower for inspection by focusing inspections on high risk ships registered in these
countries.
3.3.2. Directive 95/21/EC
In the early 1990s, the European Commission and the European
Council decided that the EU should adopt a "Common Policy on
Safe Seas." 120 Accordingly, the European Community ("EC") enacted several directives on the promotion of maritime safety and
the prevention of marine pollution. Among these, the PSCDirective 121 makes many of the provisions of the Paris MOU legally binding on all EU member states. It also includes IMO Codes
such as the ISM Code.'2 2
However, while the relationship between the Paris MOU and
the PSC-Directive is one of mutual influence, and the European
Court of Justice ("ECJ") can sanction noncompliance, 123 there are
significant weaknesses in both laws which increase the chances
that a damaged ship can "slip through the cracks." To begin with,
the Paris MOU permits a ship with a satisfactory inspection in the
previous six months to forgo inspection. 124 Selection criteria for the
inspection of ships is not standardized under either law, so each
port authority remains free to decide which vessels it will in118 See, e.g., Liberian Maritime Law, LIBERIAN CODE OF LAWS, tit. 22, § 51 (1973)
(making eligible to be documented in Liberia any vessel, "regardless of tonnage,"
owned by a citizen or national of Liberia, or any other country).
119 See BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 11, at 367-68 (noting that flag of convenience vessels from Cyprus and Malta have substandard vessels in North American, Latin American, and Western European ports); see also FOC Report, supra
note 66 (listing these countries as flags of convenience).
120 Communication from the Commission of a Common Policy on Safe Seas,
COM(93)66 final.
121 Council Directive 95/21/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 157), available at http://europa
.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga-doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&n
umdoc=31995L0021&model=guichett (last visited Oct. 27, 2004).
122 International Safety Management (ISM) Code 2002, available at http://
www.imo.org/HumanElement/mainframe.asp?topic-id=287 (last visited Nov.
10, 2004).
123 See, e.g., Case C-315/98, Commission v. Italian Republic, 1999 E.C.R. I8001 (holding that Italy failed to fulfill its obligations under the PSC-Directive by
failing to adopt the laws, regulations, and administrative provisions necessary to
implement the Directive within the prescribed period).
124 Kbnig, supra note 114, at 41.
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spect. 125 Moreover, inspection does not include a full survey of the
ship's condition, but is largely document based. 126 It was these and
other inherent weaknesses in the regulatory system that contributed to the unprecedented disaster of the Erika in 1999.
3.4. The Aftermath of ERIKA: ERIKA I and ERIKA II Proposals
On December 12, 1999, the twenty-four-year-old tanker Erika
broke in two approximately sixty miles off the French coast of Brittany. 127 Like the Prestige, the Erika was an old single-hulled tanker
nearing the end of its thirty-year lifespan and also flying a flag of
convenience. 128 The tanker spilled 31,000 tons of heavy fuel oil,
damaging nearly 400 kilometers of the Breton coastline. 129 Like the
Prestige,the Erika had been subjected to numerous port inspections
30
since 1997 that did not indicate any major structural problems.
In December 1999, the Erika had been approved by most major oil
companies, including Texaco, Repsol, Shell, the Exxon subsidiary
Standard Marine, and TotalFina, whose cargo it was carrying when
it floundered.'3 ' But the accident investigation concluded that the
Erika had indeed suffered major structural failure. 132 The oil spill
125 Member states merely have to reach their twenty-five percent target. Selection criteria is not mandatory. Id. at 42.
126 However, vessels under flags of convenience are subject to the "No More
Favorable Treatment Clauses" in the Paris MOU and the PSC-Directive. Paris
MOU, supra note 115, § 2.4; Council Directive 95/21/EC, supra note 121, art. 3,
para. 3. Since these ships usually cannot supply the required documents, they
usually undergo detailed inspections. Konig, supra note 114, at 42.
127 Z. Oya Ozoayir, The Erika and its Aftermath, 7 INT'L MAR. L.J. 230 (2000),
available at http://www.turkishpilots.org/DOCUMENTS/OyaOzcayir_-TheErika_AndItsAftermath.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2004).
128 "The 24-year-old tanker sailed under the Maltese flag and was owned by
the Savarase family of Sorrento in Italy through the Tevere Shipping Company of
Valletta. It was operated by Panship Management & Services of Italy." Id. at 231.
129 Konig, supra note 114, at 45.
130 Since November 1998, the Prestige had undergone six port inspections and
two surveys, none of which revealed any major structural problems that would
classify the vessel as unseaworthy. ABS Press Release, Nov. 20, 2002, supra note
62. However, in the investigation of the Erika spill, it was discovered that "four
out of the eight ships built in the same series [as the Erika] had suffered serious
structural damage involving cracking or buckling of the deck." Ozqayir, supra
note 127, at 231.
131 Oz(ayir, supra note 127, at 231.
132 "'It is quite clear that the Erika sank as a result of structural failure, with
disastrous results.'" Press Release, ABS, ABS Proposes Tougher Classification
Standards For Aging Vessels (Feb. 4, 2000), at http://www.eagle.org/news/press
/erika.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2004).
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received a great amount of public attention and generated political
pressure to act. It became clear to the European Commission that
the normal regulatory framework on maritime safety and efforts to
increase port state control were ineffective. The Erika was carrying
the required certificates, was under class, and had been inspected
by numerous port states, flag states, and industry agents. 33 The
Erika disaster made it clear that the EU needed to tighten its regulatory framework beyond the level of IMO standards. 34
The Erika incident brought to the forefront many long-standing
issues of debate-namely age, class, flag, and the "polyglot nature
of the tanker industry"'3 5 generally. Additionally, the oil pollution
compensation system had been criticized for merely concerning itself with how to distribute the maximum limit of compensation.
The 1969/1992 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage ("CLC" and "1992 CLC," respectively) 136 and the
1971/1992 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage
("IOPC" and "IOPC Fund," respectively) 137 conventions provided
for distribution between the ship interests and the cargo interests,
without addressing whether the cap on compensation funds was
inadequate. Moreover, the oil pollution compensation system did
not consider increasing available funds. At the time, the maximum
amount the IOPC Fund could pay was SDR135 million, or $186
million, which included the sum actually paid by the ship owner
and his insurer, the P&I club.1 38 In the case of the Erika, the French
Tribunal de Commerce determined the ship owner's liability to be
£8.4 million, or $13.6 million, which they derived from the tanker's
tonnage of 19,666 gross tonnage. 139 At its July 2000 session, the Executive Committee of the IOPC Fund decided to limit compensation from the Fund to fifty percent of the loss or damage claimants
actually suffered. This was driven by uncertainty about the total
Ozqayir, supra note 127, at 231.
134 "This is an approach the [United States] followed after the 'Exxon Valdez'
catastrophe in 1989 by enacting the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 which contains more
rigorous standards than those of international conventions .......
Kbnig, supra
note 114, at 45.
135 Ozqayir, supra note 127, at 230.
136 See discussion infra Sections 4.1., 4.3.
137 See discussion infra Sections 4.2., 4.3.
138 Ozqayir, supranote 127, at 231.
139 International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund 1992, Executive Committee,
9th Sess., 92FUND/EXC.9/7, Item 3.
133
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number of claims. 140 It was-clear that under this system, the cargo
owner and flag state had no incentive to act responsibly as liability
was automatically attributed to the ship owner. Moreover, insurers often bailed out the ship owners, immunizing them beyond
1 41
paying over a certain amount.
To address these concerns, the European Commission presented two packages of measures. The first package, ERIKA 1,142
adopted new legislative measures strengthening existing provisions on classification societies 14 3 and port state control,'" and it
enacted new regulation aimed towards the process of phasing out
single-hulled oil tankers to be accomplished by 2015.145 The second
package, ERIKA 11,146 contained a proposal on the establishment of
a European Maritime Safety Agency to "give technical support to
the maritime authorities of member states, collect information on
the implementation of [EC] legislation, and evaluate the effectiveness of existing measures." Additionally, the second set of proposals adopted measures to clarify the civil liability scheme for oil pollution and to establish a new compensation fund, the
140 Ozqayir, supra note 127, at 231. This limit was eventually raised to 100%
for claimants other than the French government and TotalFinaElf. International
Oil Pollution Compensation Funds, The Erika Incident-France,12 December 1999,
at http://www.iopcfund.org/erika.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
141 For more on strict liability under the current compensation regime, see
discussion infra Sections 4.2, 4.3.
142 The Commission adopted ERIKA I on March 21, 2000. Proposal for a Directive Amending Directive 95/21/EC, 2000 O.J. (C 212 E) 102, availableat http://
europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2000/ce212/ce2220000725en01020113pdf
(last visited Oct. 31, 2004); Proposal for a Directive Amending Directive
94/57/EC, 2000 O.J. (C 212 E) 114, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/
pri/en/oj/dat/2000/ce22/ce21220000725enO1140120.pdf (last visited Oct. 31,
2004); Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
the Accelerated Phasing-in of Double-hull or Equivalent Design Requirements for
Single Hull Oil Tankers, 2000 O.J. (C 212 E) 121, available at http://europa.
(last
eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2000/ce212/ce2220000725enO1210126.pdf
visited Oct. 31, 2004).
143 Proposal for a Directive Amending Directive 94/57/EC, supra note 142.
144 Proposal for a Directive Amending Directive 95/21/EC, supra note 142; see
also Council Directive 95/21/EC, supra note 121 (discussing expansion and standardization of port-state inspections of freight ships).
145 Vazquez, supra note 58, at 6; Kcnig, supra note 114, at 46; Ozqayir, supra
note 127.
146 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and
the Council on a Second Set of Community Measures on Maritime Safety Following the Sinking of the Oil Tanker Erika, COM(00)802 final, available at
http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/en/com/pdf/2000/en_50OPCO802_0.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
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Compensation Fund for Oil Pollution Damage ("COPE"), endowing it with E1 billion. 147 While the EU adopted ERIKA I, the ERIKA
II measures and the creation of the EU's own system of liability
and compensation 148 were still being considered. 49
The ERIKA II proposals were directed towards increasing the
efficiency of port state controls.150 The Erika incident had demonstrated that both the Paris MOU and the PSC-Directive were delinquent in safeguarding coastal states and their marine environments. Under ERIKA I and II, member states would now be
obligated to inspect ships with a high "target factor," those ships
that pose a high risk due to their age, flag, or previous detentions.1 1 Accordingly, oil tankers of a certain age would be subject
to a mandatory expanded inspection whenever such a vessel
would enter an EU port after a period of twelve months, and the
age limit for high risk ships would be reduced from twenty to
twenty-five to fifteen years. 5 2 The most important measure in the
proposal, however, is the banning 5 3 of single-hulled oil tankers
from all EC ports. The ban applied to ships that were more than
fifteen years old, were past offenders, or sailed under a flag of convenience from a black listed country. 5 4 The gradual phase out of
Vizquez, supra note 58, at 6.
See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the Establishment of a Fund for the Compensation of Oil Pollution
Damage in European Waters and Related Measures, 2001 O.J. (C 120 E) 79 (discussing the creation of a supplementary fund to pay liability and compensation
awards to victims of oil spills in European waters), available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/cel2O/ce12020010424
en00790082.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2004).
149 See Memorandum from the European Commission Directorate General for
Energy and Transport, Erika: Two Years On [hereinafter Memorandum] (reiterating the need for implementation of newly adopted maritime safety regulations), at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/transport/library/erika-en.pdf (last visited Oct. 31,
2004).
150 Id. at 4.
151 Knig, supra note 114, at 48.
152 Id. For a more detailed outline of ERIKA I measures, see Henrik Ringbom,
The Erika Accident and Its Effects on EU Maritime Regulation, CURRENT MARINE
147

148

ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA

265-90 (Myron H. Nordquist & John Norton Moore eds., 2001) (examining the
Erika incident's scale and the reach of its effects) and Oz~ayir, supra note 127 (investigating the Erika incident and its consequences).
153 This measure has already been imposed under U.S. law. The Oil Pollution
Act of 1990 establishes that vessels can be denied entry into U.S. regional ports if
they do not comply with applicable CDEM standards or if they have a history of
accidents, pollution, or serious repair problems. Ktnig, supra note 114, at 49.
154 Id.
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single-hulled tankers was originally contemplated by MARPOL,
but the 46th session of the Maritime Environment Protection
Committee ("MEPC") of the IMO in April 2001 adopted an acceleration of the phase out period by draft agreement to the MARPOL
73/78 Regulation 13G of Annex 1.155
In adopting the Commission proposal on February 26, 2001, the
European Council kept out more draconian proposals from the final legislation. 156 Some member states feared that more stringent
legislation might lead to competitive disadvantages for European
ports, or that a stricter practice would trigger retaliatory measures
against member state ships in non-European ports. 57 Accordingly,
member states were slow to implement these measures, 158 and "the
Council introduced several flexibility clauses that allow the member states to exempt certain ships from the mandatory annual expanded inspection and to gradually reinforce their inspection services until 1 January 2003." 159 Though the ERIKA I and ERIKA II
proposals remained at the forefront of maritime law and carrier liability schemes, the immediacy of their approval and implementation became apparent when the Prestige mimicked the Erika's watery demise three years later.
4. LIABILITY CLAIMS CONCERNING THE PRESTIGE: WHO PAYS?

Now that the relevant law has been set out, it is possible to
make a more nuanced analysis of civil liability and compensation
regimes. Problems arising from jurisdiction, choice of law, standard of liability, and enforcement of judgment that typically
plague cross-boundary pollution claims are multiplied in the cases
of ships. This often results in protracted litigation and delayed
payment of damages.
Prior to 1969, virtually no liability was placed on ships that
caused marine pollution. The offending ship's liability was generally limited to its liability tonnage, with amounts restricted by the
1957 International Convention Relating to the Limitation of LiabilOz(ayir, supra note 127, at 234.
156 For example, the European Parliament wanted to add that high risk ships
also be refused access to the territorial waters of member states, which would violate the principle of right of innocent passage. Kbnig, supra note 114, at 49-50.
157 Id. at 52.
158 This is largely attributed to the increase in workload for port state control
officers and the need for rapid recruitment and training of additional personnel.
Id. at 51.
159 Id.
155
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ity of Owners of Sea-going Ships ("the 1957 Limited Liability Convention"); in non-party countries, liability was limited to the total
6
value of ship and cargo. 60 But the 1967 Torrey Canyon' ' disaster
demonstrated that the existing rules for limitation of liability were
inadequate to address a major oil spill accident. Specifically, the
old liability regime failed to address the growing role of the mari1 62
time insurance industry. In response, the IMO produced CLC
and IOPC.163 These two conventions became the basis of the marine pollution liability system. In conjunction with their respective
1992 protocols, the IMO conventions represent one approach to establishing a more satisfactory regime for oil pollution liability.
Both conventions enable claims for damages to be brought in the
courts of the party state where the damage occurs, regardless of
where the ship is registered. 164 As in port state enforcement of the
MARPOL Convention, the vessel does not have 65to be registered
under a flag state that is party to the conventions.

Z. Oya Oz4ayir, Limitation of Liability Problems in Cases of Oil Pollution, 110
MAR. STUD. 1 (2000), available at http://www.turkishpilots.org/DOCUMENTS/
Oya_OzcayirLiability.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2004).
161 For more on the Torrey Canyon, see generally 'TORREY CANYON': POLLUTION
AND MARINE LIFE (J.E. Smith ed., 1968) (departing on data concerning the Torrey
Canyon oil spill) and DE LA RUE & ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 11-21 (recounting the
Torrey Canyon oil spill).
162 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage,
Nov. 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CLC], reprinted in 6A BENEDICT ON
ADMIRALTY, Doc. 6-3 (Frank L. Wiswall, Jr. ed., 2001) [hereinafter BENEDICT], as
amended by Protocol to the CLC, Dec. 2, 1992 [hereinafter 1992 CLC], reprintedin
BENEDICT, supra at Doc. 6-4B.
163 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund
for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Dec. 18, 1971, 1110 U.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter IOPC], reprinted in BENEDICT, supra note 162, at Doc. 6-8, as amended by Protocol to the IOPC, Dec. 2, 1992 [hereinafter IOPC Fund], reprintedin BENEDICT, supra note 162, at Doc. 6-9B. The shipping and oil industry, in turn, produced two of
their own agreements, the TOVALOP in 1969 and CRISTAL in 1971, which both
ended on February 20, 1997. Oz4ayir, supra note 160. For more information on
the TOVALOP and CRISTAL agreements, see generally DE LA RUE & ANDERSON,
supra note 3, 229-61 (analyzing and explaining the TOVALOP and CRISTAL
schemes) and I.C. White, The Voluntary Oil Spill Compensation AgreementsTOVALOP and CRISTAL, in LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE To THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT
57-69 (Colin M. De La Rue ed., 1993) (explaining the voluntary funding regimes
for Torrey Canyon).
164 See BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 11, at 385 (describing how the oil pollution
conventions address the liability for oil pollution from ships).
165 Id.
160
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4.1. The 1969 InternationalConvention on Civil Liabilityfor Oil
Pollution Damage
The aim of the CLC is to ensure that adequate compensation is
made available to persons who suffer damage resulting from oil
pollution involving oil-carrying ships. 166 The convention places liability for such damage on the owner of the ship, which in the Prestige case, is Mare Shipping. However, if the owner is not guilty of
actual fault, he may limit his liability. 67 The convention requires
ships to maintain insurance or security in sums equivalent to the
owner's liability for one incident. 168
The 1992 CLC widened the scope of the convention to cover
pollution damage caused in the EEZ of a state party. 169 As before,
the protocol covers pollution damage, but environmental damage
compensation is limited to costs incurred by reasonable measures
taken to reinstate the contaminated environment. While the CLC
only applied to damage caused by measures taken after the oil had
escaped, the 1992 protocols cover expenses incurred for preventive
measures, provided that it can be demonstrated that there was a
grave and imminent threat of pollution damage.170 Additionally,
under the CLC, a ship owner could not limit his liability if the
claimant proved that the incident occurred as a result of the
owner's personal fault. However, under the 1992 protocols a ship
owner loses the right to limit liability only if it is proved that the
pollution resulted from his personal act or omission, and was
committed with the intent to cause such damage, or was committed recklessly and with knowledge that such damage would result.' 7 ' The Spanish Government is pursuing its claims against
Mare Shipping in the Spanish courts under this last prong. Spain
is arguing that because the ship owners were directly responsible
for the poor condition and unseaworthiness of the ship, they acted
recklessly in allowing it to sail with hazardous cargo into high
seas.172
167

Wolfrum, supra note 92, at 268.
Id. at 268-69.

168

Id.

169

BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 11, at 385-86; see also discussion infra Section

170

Ozqayir, supra note 160.

166

4.3.
Wolfrum, supra note 92, at 269; Ozqayir, supra note 160.
Under this rationale, it can be argued that the flag state of the Bahamas is
directly liable since it issues seaworthy certificates. However, it is usually more
practical to go after ship owners than flag states. See discussion infra Section 4.4.
171
172
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4.2. The 1971 InternationalConvention on the Establishmentof an
InternationalFundfor Compensationfor Oil Pollution Damage
The purpose of the IOPC is to compensate states and persons
who suffer pollution damage when they are unable to obtain any
173
or sufficient compensation from the owner of the polluting ship.
Under the IOPC, victims of oil pollution may be compensated in an
amount beyond that of the ship owner's liability. 174 The IOPC is
not obligated to indemnify the owner if damage is caused by his
willful misconduct or if the accident was caused, in any way, by
the vessel's noncompliance with current maritime safety and environmental protection conventions. 75 Contributions to the IOPC
are made by all parties receiving oil transported by sea in contracting states. Furthermore, the IOPC Fund increased compensation
amounts in line with the 1992 CLC, including, for the first time,
costs for preventive measures.176
4.3. The 1992 Protocols
The old regime was amended in 1992, and the amended con178
77
ventions became known as the 1992 CLC and the IOPC Fund.
These amended conventions provide higher limits on compensation and a broader scope of application. The 1992 CLC is based on
the principle of the ship owners' strict liability, creating a system of
compulsory liability insurance. 179 The IOPC Fund, which supplements the 1992 CLC, provides additional compensation to injured
parties when the compensation under the CLC is inadequate. 180 By
becoming a member of the CLC, a state becomes eligible to share in
the corresponding IOPC Fund. In October 2000, the IMO adopted
two resolutions increasing the limits contained in the 1992 CLC
(comparing the liability of ship owners versus flag states).
173 Wolfrum, supranote 92, at 270.
174

Id.

175

Id.

176 BIRNIE & BOYLE,

supra note 11, at 386.

177 1992 CLC, supra note 162.

IOPC, supra note 163.
Jose Maura Barandiaran, The International Regime on Liability and
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage: Recent Developments, Presentation at
the Workshop "Lessons Learnt after the Prestige" 2 (Nov. 13, 2003), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/civil/marin/prestige-catania/prestig
e-workshop-catania/session6/presentation-maura.pdf (last visited Nov. 17,
2004).
180 Id.
178

179
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and IOPC Fund by fifty percent. 181 These amendments brought the
total amount available under the conventions to approximately
182
€250 million.
The ability of charterers to limit their liability under the IOPC
Fund was not tested until the Aegean Sea case 183 in 1998. The British court was asked whether charterers were entitled to limit their
liability with respect to spill claims brought against them by the
ship owners. The court held that the IOPC Fund gave the charterers no right to limit their liability in such unsafe port claims
brought against them by the ship owners. 8 4 If the oil pollution
claims had been brought directly against the charterer, then limitation would have been possible under the IOPC Fund; however, "if
the claims are brought against the owner first and the owner seeks
to recover from charterers as damages then limitation is not possi5
ble."'18
Under the current compensation regime, it is believed that insurers and the existing compensation fund will cover the first £180
million of damage resulting from the Prestige oil spill. 186 The first
tier of compensation is provided by the CLC and 1992 CLC. The
CLC makes the ship owner responsible for damage caused by oil
spills only to a limited amount. 87 Paying indemnity on a scale according to the wrecked ship's tonnage, the London P&I Club will
cover the ship owner's liability for approximately £22 million,
much less than the originally estimated £42 million clean-up bill.188
181The amendments entered into force on Nov. 1, 2003. Id. at 4.
182 Id. at 5.

183 The owners sought to recover from the charterers, amounts representing
the value of claims made against them as well as the value of the vessel, its bunkers, and its freight. The owners claimed that they were entitled to implied indemnity because the tanker had been sent to an unsafe port and the loss was sustained as a consequence of complying with the charterers' orders. Aegean Sea
Traders Corp. v. Repsol Petroleo S.A., 2 Lloyd's Rep. 39, 42-43 (Q.B. 1998).
184 Id. at 49.

185 Oz~ayir, supra note 160; see also Aegean Sea Traders, 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 49
(stating that the Fund Convention does not subject claims by ship owners against
charterer to limitations). For a more general overview of the liability of charterers,
see generally DE LA RUE & ANDERSON, supra note 3, 613-53 (detailing the liabilities
of charterers and cargo owners).
186 Fleming, supra note 67.

187 "It explicitly exempts the oil company that chartered the ship from liability." Briefing, Friends of the Earth, Prestige Oil Spill -Who Foots the Bill? 2 (Nov.
2002) [hereinafter Friends of the Earth Briefing], at http://www.foe.co.uk/
resource/briefings/prestige-oiLspillwho-pays.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2004).
188 IOPC Prestige Report, supra note 4.
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In addition to this modest amount, the IOPC and IOPC Fund provide a second tier of compensation and will contribute as much as
E155 million, bringing the total available funds to meet victims'
claims' 89 to approximately £180 million. 190 Under the terms of the
IOPC Fund, no claim can be filed against the ship owner or the
cargo company above the maximum amount of liability set by the
convention, unless it is demonstrated that the accident was caused
by the owner's gross negligence.'91 However, there are additional
ways of circumventing IOPC and IOPC Fund limits. Claims could
be brought against ABS or against the cargo interests if it can be
shown that the tanker was improperly loaded. At times, even the
IOPC has sued on behalf of the victims to obtain additional compensation when filed claims exceeded the limit of designated compensation. 192 The EU is waiting for the IOPC Fund to increase its
current liability limit. In the event that this increase does not meet
expected objectives, the EU is planning to create its own system of
1 93
liability and compensation-the COPE.
4.4. Other PotentialSources of Compensation: A Considerationof the
"PolluterPays" Principle
The 1992 CLC channels liability not to the ship's operator nor
to its cargo owner, but to the ship owner, who may be sued only in
accordance with the convention. The 1992 CLC prohibits claims to
be made in excess of certain limits, unless it can be shown that the
damage resulted from some negligent act on the ship owner's
The fund acknowledges that there is still some uncertainty about the extent of admissible claims. IOPC Sets CompensationLevel at $178m to Be Able to Meet
Compensation Claims, LLOYD'S LIsT, Nov. 20, 2002, available at 2002 WL 26531552.
190 Some sources estimate that available funds are less than £180 million, and
closer to £172 million. See IOPC Prestige Report, supra note 4 (calculating that £22
million is available from ship owners' insurance and £150 million from the 1992
Fund).
191 Fleming, supranote 67.
192 This was the case in 1992, when the Aegean Sea ran aground in La Corufia
Bay provoking claims of £278.7 million. Id.
193 The Compensation for Oil Pollution in European Waters Fund ("COPE")
would top up the Civil Liability Convention and International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund systems in force. See European Parliament Resolution on the
'Prestige' Oil Tanker Disaster Off the Coast of Galicia, 2004 O.J. (C 25 E) 415 [hereinafter COPE Resolution] (calling for an additional European Compensation funding of E1 billion for oil pollution damage to be implemented immediately), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/ dat/2004/ceO25/ce 02520040129
en04150417.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2004).
189
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part. 9 4 The purpose of the 1992 protocols was to increase the
owner's liability for damage to a minimum of approximately €60
million for the very largest tankers. 195 This is the amount the Spanish Government is requesting from the London P&I Club, the Pres196
tige owner's insurer.
Numerous critics have argued that with regard to ultra hazardous activities at sea, such as the operation of large oil tankers,
both the ship owner and the flag state should be held strictly liable.
A regime rarely has held flag states or ship owners absolutely liable. There are very few cases where flag states have paid compensation for pollution from unseaworthy oil tankers. 197 Moreover, pollution from oil tankers has generally not been the subject
of interstate claims, even in the cases of large oil spills such as the
1978 Amoco Cadiz. 98 Most claims are, instead, dealt with under national law or civil liability and compensation schemes believed to
be swifter and more efficient than litigation. 199
Other critics endorse adopting the "polluter pays" principle articulated in the preamble of the 1990 Oil Pollution Response Convention. 200 The principle is primarily intended to ensure that the
costs of dealing with pollution are not borne by the public authorities, but rather, directed at the polluter. The result of adopting this
policy could mean that liability would not be limited to direct injury, but potentially encompass environmental damages as well. 201
Despite a general endorsement of the "polluter pays" principle,2° 2 there are distinct limitations to the concept. To begin with,
the identity of the polluter is not self-evident in the complex industry of shipping. For example, in the case of the Prestige, Captain
Mangouras and his crew could be deemed the polluters since it can
be argued that their negligence in some way caused the ship to
BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 11, at 386.
Id.
196 See Fleming, supra note 67 (noting that the Spanish government's Development Ministry demanded a deposit of €60 million from the company as a guarantee that could compensate the government in its suit against the company).
197 BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 11, at 382-83.
194
195

198

Id. at 383.

199

Id.

200 Id. at 384.

BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 11, at 383.
See, e.g., Hofer, supra note 42, at 4 ("A very strict regime, providing the
removal of the ceilings on maritime liabilities, could bring about a greater sense of
responsibility among operators.").
201

202
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sink. But it can also be said that the cargo is the element that directly caused the pollution, and therefore Crown Resources is the
real polluter. Alternatively, it can be argued that Mare Shipping is
most responsible for ensuring the seaworthiness of its vessel, as it
has the strongest interest in insuring the vessel, and therefore it
should be held liable as the polluter. 2 3 Additionally, in the present
case, there are still others like ABS who argue that Spain and Porlinked to the
tugal's interference in the salvage efforts were directly 204
polluters.
possible
damage, making both governments
The party that is made liable is ultimately a policy choice, since
no one possibility is easily resolved by the "polluter pays" concept.
Therefore, many prefer the current liability and compensation regime which divides responsibility between the ship owner and the
cargo owner, while excluding the liability of any other potential
defendant in order to facilitate easy recovery by plaintiffs.
Another problem evolving out of the "polluter pays" principle
is that it is unrealistic for the polluter to pay the full extent of the
damages. In the shipping industry, insurance is the main source in
the case of a ship owner's liability. Industry funds and maritime
treaties limit this liability. 20 5 When compensation is limited, there
may not be enough to meet all claims for economic loss and environmental harm. When this occurs, losses are often prioritized, or,
in the case of IOPC funds, paid pro rata. 20 6 This, again, is usually a
policy choice. 20 7 Nonetheless, the short time that elapsed between
the Erika and the Prestige disasters and the magnitude of the damage they both caused demonstrate that perhaps the current liability
scheme is inadequate, and that implementing the "polluter pays"
principle into the contemporary liability and compensation
20 8
schemes is warranted.

203

BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 11, at 384.

See ABS Press Release, June 30, 2003, supra note 73 (claiming that the extensive pollution is directly attributable to Spain's failure to properly activate an
oil spill contingency plan as required by Spanish law).
205 BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 11, at 384-85.
204

206

Id.

Id.
Though the European Parliament, Commission, and member states finalized a deal on February 20, 2004, which institutes the "polluter pays" principle as
the foundation of EU environmental liability legislation, the legislation will not
apply to damage caused by oil tanker spills. Joe Kirwin, EU States, Parliament
Reach Agreement on Law Instituting 'Polluter Pays' Principle, 27 Int'l Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 4, at 127 (Feb. 25, 2004).
207

208
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4.5. What is Wrong With the CurrentRegime?
The EU's response to oil spill accidents is "much less firm than
that of the United States, giving up a unilateral strategy that affects
the polluter's liability." 209 Under no circumstances is liability for
marine casualties unlimited, although it has been substantially increased in recent international conventions; nor is unlimited liability a viable possibility in future EC initiatives. 210 Instead the current liability and compensation scheme continues to dilute liability
in a joint fund, with the only difference being that it will be funded
internationally if IOPC funds are used, or by European oil companies if COPE is adopted by the EU.211 Moreover, the European
Commission itself has acknowledged 21 2 that the established liability of the fund is in conflict with the "polluter pays" principle and
fails to create efficient incentives for prevention. 213 The safety
packages and increased compensation schemes resulting from the
Erika legislation reflect the EU's hesitancy to upset the powerful oil
lobbies and companies connected with hydrocarbon traffic. While
the IMO seems to be working towards increasing the fund to meet
the demands of affected parties, it, nonetheless, does not perceive it
critical to enact more stringent liability standards that would teach
oil companies not to regard oil spills as the acceptable market costs
of their ultra hazardous activities. 214
The maze of offshore ownership, flag-of-convenience registry,
limited insurance, and legal liability operate as a "corporate veil" 215
under which corporations hide their liabilities, eschew accountability through subsidiaries, and, generally, "pass the buck." 216 As a
result, too much of the risk and consequent loss is borne by public
authorities and individual victims who must usually wait years to
receive any remuneration. 217 Liability should be concentrated on
209 Vizquez, supra note 58, at 7.
210 Id.
211 Id.

212 See White Paper on Environmental Liability, COM(00)66 final at 24 (stating that limited liability for natural resource damage erodes the effectiveness of
the "polluter pays" principle).
213 Vizquez, supra note 58, at 7.
214

Id.

Friends of the Earth Briefing, supra note 187, at 2.
216 Id.
217 See Joaquin Prieto, El 'Erika' Aan Estd Pendiente de Juicio [The Erika Is Still
Involved in Judicial Proceedings], EL PAfs, Nov. 20, 2002, at 20 (drawing comparisons
between the Erika indemnification process and the Prestige case; emphasizing the
215
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the oil industry that profits most from the transport of hazardous
cargo.
An additional weakness of the current compensation regime is
the exclusion of recovery for environmental damage. The IOPC
Fund does not cover environmental damage, only compensation
for the cost of clean up and the loss of income by those directly affected by the spill.218 Governments can claim compensation for the
cost of removing oil from coastal areas, cleaning marine wildlife,
and even "loss of wages" to entire sectors of their economy, such
as fishing or tourism. 219 However, compensation does not cover
damage to marine and bird habitats or extinction of endangered
species. 220 This is a critical point of issue with the current compensation regime, especially for affected areas where biodiversity is integral to regional economy.221
Finally, the current compensation scheme under the IOPC
Fund "is hopelessly inadequate to deal with large oil spills.""' The
fund's reserves are built up over time so that a series of oil spills
such as the 1992 Aegean Sea, 1999 Erika, and 2002 Prestige could exfact that the claims are still being processed three years after the incident); Catalina Guerrero, Francia: "ERIKA"-Secuelas del "Erika" Aan Visibles Tres Afios
Despuis de Naufragio ["Erika" -Consequences of the "Erika" Are Still Visible Three
Years After the Shipwreck], EFE NEWSWIRE SERVIcES, Dec. 12, 2002 ("Al cumplirse
hoy tres afios del naufragio del petrolero "Erika" ... la indemnizaci6n de las victimas amenaza con dirimirse en los tribunales ...." ["Today, on the three-year
anniversary of the "Erika" shipwreck ... victims' indenmification threatens to be
settled in the courts .. 1), availableat LEXIS, News Library, Spanish Newswire
Services File.
218 "Compensation for environmental damage (other than economic loss resulting from impairment of the environment) is restricted to costs for reasonable
measures to reinstate the contaminated environment. Claims for damage to the
ecosystem are not admissible." International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds,
Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.iopcfund.org/FAQs.htm#c8 (last visited Oct. 12, 2004).
219 See DE LA RUE & ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 472-502 (demonstrating that
the IOPC has generally accepted claims in a variety of sectors claiming economic
loss due to oil pollution, save claims by public bodies for loss of tax revenue, and
certain shipping claims).
220 Friends of the Earth Briefing, supra note 187, at 2; see also DE LA RUE &
ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 504 ("Claims for the costs of restoration ...are concerned with measures taken after clean-up has been completed. These involve
human intervention in natural processes by steps designed to encourage or accelerate natural recovery ....).
221 See White Paper on Environmental Liability, supra note 212, at 18-20 (proposing a potential European Community liability regime that begins to cover biodiversity damage within the limits of existing European Community biodiversity
legislation).
222 Friends of the Earth Briefing, supra note 187, at 1.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

1430

U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.

[Vol. 25:4

haust the Fund quickly.22 3 While creating another joint liability
fund to increase the availability of funds for indemnification will
ameliorate this problem, environmentalists argue that a better solution would mirror the one envisioned by the 1990 U.S. Oil Pollution Act, 224 which assigns unlimited liability to negligent "deep
pockets" that profit most from the transport of oil.
To make matters worse, "[tihe IOPC Fund has a reputation for
disputing compensation claims from oil spills in order to reduce
payouts from the Fund." 225 Claims take a long time to process and
payments do not materialize until years later, which offers little
remedy to disadvantaged victims. Moreover, payments can be further delayed if criminal actions are initiated against any of the parties involved, which both disincentivizes the development of effective criminal sanctions in environmental regulation and
unrealistically postpones monetary relief. 226
5.

CONCLUSION: PRESTIGE... NUNCA MAIS?

Nearly two and a half years after the Prestige sank to the bottom of the Atlantic, the cries of "Nunca mais!" have grown fainter,
and their angry tone and air of urgency has quieted significantly.
While the slogan that came to epitomize the Spanish and greater
European frustration with the international community's inability
223

Id.

224 Oil Pollution Act of 1990 ("OPA"), 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-20 (2000). It should

be noted, however, that OPA modified the terms of the Oil Pollution Trust Fund
by capping the maximum to be paid out from the Fund at US $1 billion per incident, with a cap of US $50 million with regards to contaminated natural resources.
However, it is not clear whether this amount includes the sums paid by the responsible party; the IOPC Fund's ceiling of compensation does include reparations by the responsible party. Moreover, if the US $1 billion is insufficient to
compensate for all damages, it will not be reduced pro rata like IOPC Fund payments, but will be reimbursed in full by the order in which claims were presented
to the Trust Fund. Wu CHAO, POLLUTION FROM THE CARRIAGE OF OIL BY SEA:
LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION 248 (Kluwer Law International 1997).
225 Friends of the Earth Briefing, supra note 187, at 2.
226 See Petrolero-GobiernoMichavila: responsables responderdn Justicia en vfas penal y civil [Oil Tanker - Government Michavila:responsible parties will answer to Justice
by criminal and civil proceedings], EFE NEWS SERVICES, Dec. 10, 2002 (describing how
criminal actions are being taken against the captain and the ship owner of the
Prestige), available at LEXIS, News Library, Spanish News Services File; El Naufragio del 'Prestige' Desata una Batalla Legal por las Indemnizaciones [The 'Prestige'
Shipwreck Unleashes a Legal Battle over Compensation], RECOLETOS CIA EDITORIAL
EXPANSION (Madrid), Nov. 21, 2002 ("Todo sera sencillo si se resuelve por la via
civil." ["Everything will be easy if it is resolved by civil proceedings."]), available
at LEXIS, News Library, Spanish News Services File.
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to effectively regulate marine environmental safety can still be seen
affixed to car bumpers and street signs in northern Spanish and
French fishing villages, concern over whether another Prestige
could happen has largely dissipated. The fickle compass of popular attention is presently occupied by European politics and recent
national traumas, while the pressing immediacy of the Prestige incident fades further into the recesses of collective memory. "Basta
Ya!" ["Enough!"] has replaced "Nunca Mais!" as Spain reels from its
most recent national tragedy -a series of terrorist bombs set off in
killnumerous commuter trains during the mad Madrid rush hour,
227 It is
others.
1,400
than
more
injuring
and
ing over 200 people
understandable that that the Prestige and its victims should take a
backseat on the national and European agendas for the moment.
However, it is essential to prevent the presence of one disaster
from obliterating the memory of the other.
One could argue that it was such "forgetfulness," or rather
complacency, that was the real tragedy of the Erika spill five years
ago. While it remained long enough on the European conscience
to spur new and stricter standards for marine transport regulation,
legislators were so pleased with the design of the new plan that
they forgot that the true herculean task was to implement their
new design and ensure that it actually functioned. Unfortunately, it
would take another devastating oil spill and countless other victims to show European legislators that the increasingly unregulated "race to the bottom" among cargo owners, seeking cheap
means of transporting their hazardous goods, remains a real and
pressing problem that requires drastic overhauling of the current
regulation and a serious reconsideration of generally accepted liability and compensation regimes.
That the Prestige occurred so soon after Europe had implemented a stricter regulatory framework to address the Erika spill
highlights the inadequacy of the current system. Though singlehulled tankers were in the process of officially being phased out,
aging single-hulled tankers like the Prestige would continue to sail
228
precariously close to the European coastline in innocent passage.
227 See Spain Mourns Train Attack Victims, BBC NEWS U.K. EDITION, Mar. 12,
2004 ("Spain is beginning three days of mourning for the deaths of at least 198
people in bomb attacks in Madrid .... More than 1400 people were injured as 10
"),availableat http://news.bbc.co.uk/
bombs ripped through commuter trains ....
Oct. 21, 2004).
visited
(last
1/hi/world/europe/3504046.stm
M On July 22, 2003, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union amended Regulation 417/2002. This was a measure to accelerate the
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Defective tankers could sail in and out of port states and emerge
from routine inspections both by port states and classification societies without so much as a blemish on their records. Flag states
eschew responsibility as they continue collecting hefty registration
fees from non-national ship owners who register ships in places
like Panama, Liberia, and the Bahamas, 229 while port states strain to
finance more sophisticated systems of inspection in port state control. Moreover, when accidents do occur, liability regimes shield
those actors in the best position to protect the marine environment
by ensuring the seaworthiness of their vessels. Multi-tier joint
compensation funds are ineffective in covering damage beyond the
limited liability of ship owners and cargo owners, as oil spills become more damaging and clean up costs become more exorbitant.
The current Prestige claims of over E676 million 230 grossly exceed
the available compensation funds, which will only pay out up to
C180 million to affected claimants. This means that victims will receive pro rata payments equaling a fraction of the actual loss suffered. Any claims exceeding available funds need to be sought in
court, which means increased delay in victim indemnification as
well as expensive litigation fees.231
The international community needs to implement a stricter liability and compensation regime that allows cargo owners, ship
phasing out of single-hulled tankers and the incorporation of the condition assessment scheme for tankers, regardless of design, fifteen years or older beginning
in 2005. Council Regulation 1726/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 249) 1, 3, available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/1249/124920031001en000100
04.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2004).
229 See FOC Report, supra note 66 (detailing the current state of the world's
flag of convenience registered vessels).
230 The largest claim is made by the Spanish Government, totaling €384 million in clean-up costs, and payments made to businesses and individuals that
were affected by the spill. Additionally, there is a £131 million claim by a group
of 13,600 affected fishermen and shellfish harvesters. IOPC Prestige Report, supra
note 4.
231 The Amoco Cadiz litigation in the United States finally concluded in January of 1992, fourteen years after the incident, "with an award to claimants of some
US $61 million, plus interest." However, the incident occurred before France ratified the Fund Conventions and thus, compensation was not governed by them.
DE LA RUE & ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 32-33. While the damages awarded may
have satisfied the French State, many Breton communities which had invested
heavily in the trial received barely one tenth of the amount claimed. Emmanuel
Fontaine, The French Experience: 'Tanio' and 'Amoco Cadiz' Incidents Compared, in
LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE To THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 101, 105 (Colin M. De La Rue,
ed., 1993). See generally In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir.
1992) (adjudicating jurisdictional, liability, and damages issues surrounding 1978
Amoco Cadiz disaster).
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owners, and their respective agents to have unlimited liability in
cases where negligence or gross negligence is demonstrated to
have been a significant factor in the resulting environmental damage. 232 This is perhaps the most important measure that the IMO
should adopt to address the inadequacy of the current system. Al233
though the phasing out of "rust bucket" single-hulled tankers
has been accelerated, 23 4 more immediately effective reforms are
needed while single and double-hulled tankers transporting ultra
hazardous cargos continue to sail through particularly sensitive
marine areas. 235 The absolute phasing-out of single-hulled tankers
in the EU is not expected to be complete until 2010,236 and the
groups
measure is being met with strong opposition by lobbying
237 and a lukewarm response by the IMO. 238 By imlike Intertanko,
posing unlimited liability on ship owners, cargo owners, and their
agents, the international community will incentivize actors who are
in the best position by their control over the operation of the vessel,
to ensure that the vessel meets current IMO convention standards.
The hesitancy in doing this arises from the fact that the CLC strictly limits
liability even in cases where negligence can be shown; permitting unlimited liability would require member states to formally withdraw from the CLC Conventions. See Ringbom, supra note 152, at 277 (discussing the limitations of the international regime with respect to outside compensation claims).
233 Memorandum, European Commission, Erika: Two Years On (Nov. 27,
2001), at http://europa.eu.int/comm/transport/library/erika-en.pdf (last visited
Oct. 1, 2004).
234 The EU measure banning single-hulled ships carrying heavy fuel oil took
effect on October 21, 2003. The new law forbids "the use of single-hulled ships
aged twenty-three years or older as of 2005 instead of the previous commitment to
2007." Additionally, "all other single-hulled ships must be phased out completely
by 2010" instead of the previous commitment to 2015 under the ERIKA I package.
Joe Kirwin, EU Ban on Single-Hull Tankers Takes Effect, Officials Vow to Seek Worldwide Prohibition,26 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 1077 (Nov. 5, 2003).
235 In December, 2003, the IMO's Marine Environment Protection Committee
approved designating Europe's western coastline a particularly sensitive sea area,
subject to special protection. See Patrick Tracey, Special Report: EU Backs Wider Use
of Sensitive Areas; Tanker Owners Fear Patchwork Regulation, 27 Int'l Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 5, at 207 (Mar. 10, 2004).
236 Kirwin, supra note 234.
237 Intertanko claims that the costs of the new EU rules far outweigh the benefits, costing member states an estimated US $4 billion due to the loss of use of single-hulled ships. Id.
238 Additionally, IMO Secretary-General William O'Neil noted that the IMO
was the appropriate forum for consideration of such measures and that there was
"no room for unilateral measures." See Patrick Tracey, Single-Hull Tanker Phase
Out Accelerated, Heavy Grades of Oil Restricted from Shipping, 26 Int'l Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 26, at 1240, 1241 (Dec. 3, 2003).
232
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In keeping with the preventative approach, delinquent flag
states should be penalized financially for failure to regulate vessels
with unseaworthy CDEM sailing under their flags. These penalty
awards can be distributed among port states to help them fund the
hiring and management of more vessel inspectors. Port state control has been a successful instrument of vessel regulation, but it is
expensive for states to maintain these systems as they require more
sophisticated technology and international coordination. Port
states should have the right to refuse entry to tankers wishing to
enter the port that do not meet current IMO standards, as well as
the right to detain vessels that are egregious violators of those
standards. Many of the proposals contained under ERIKA II are
dedicated to strengthening the regulatory role of port state con23 9
trol.

Swift implementation of the ERIKA II proposals is also favorable because it would grant member states broader intervention
rights when a vessel's passage through their EEZ poses a serious
environmental threat to their coastline or offshore economic interests, as in the case of the Galician fisheries. Member states would
be permitted "to order re-routing of a ship posing a threat to their
coasts, to instruct the ship's master to stop a pollution risk, to put
an assessment team on board, or to impose mandatory pilotage or
towage of the ship." 240 While intervention on the high seas is risky
and vehemently opposed by the marine shipping industry, a more
coordinated and regulated system of intervention could have
saved the Prestige.241
In granting member states broader intervention rights, the IMO
could also compel "Member States to take measures to receive
ships in distress in ports of refuge, and prohibit ships from leaving
239 See Ozqayir, supra note 127 (detailing the second phase of the Erika Proposals, including establishing a stronger system for community monitoring, control, information system for maritime traffic, instituting mandatory reporting systems, and requiring ships calling at European Community ports to carry black
boxes in order to facilitate the investigation of accidents).
240 Id.
241 Absent guidance from the IMO, some member states have already taken
the initiative; contracting parties to the Barcelona Convention agreed to petition
their national legislatures to "develop a checklist to determine the best course of
action for distressed ships" floundering in their waters. "Steps that may be included in the list [are]: identifying nearby ports where superior emergency facilities are available; developing protocols for towing at-risk vessels; and forming
rapid-response teams ...." Eric J. Lyman, Parties to Barcelona Conventiona Call for
Ban On Single-Hull Tankers by End of 2005, 26 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at
1131, 1132 (Nov. 19, 2003).
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ports in exceptional weather conditions involving a serious threat
to safety or the environment." 242 The proposals in ERIKA II "aim
to make it easier to seek a port of refuge in the event of trouble at
sea, and also to prevent the risk of accident by prohibiting ships
from leaving ports of call in the community if particularly bad
243
weather and sea conditions increase the risk of an accident."
However, it is necessary for the international community to design
a coordinated plan of oil spill response in order to respond quickly
and efficiently when these disasters happen. Proactive steps have
been taken, in this respect, by expanding the authority of the European Maritime Safety Agency ("EMSA") to tackle pollution emergencies. 244 The progressive widening of EMSA responsibilities
may evolve into the creation of a full-fledged European coast
guard, although whether the agency will maintain a permanent
245
fleet is pending advice from an ongoing independent study.
Moving beyond prevention, legislators must embrace the rising
approach towards environmental law in which courts have broad
discretion to determine what kinds of damage to biodiversity and
the environment qualify as compensable "pollution damage." As
of May 2004, as many as 300 locations in Galicia and the adjoining
Bay of Biscay continue to be affected by the oil contamination, in246
cluding a number of areas designated for habitat protection. The
current system only recognizes damage that is pure economic loss
or loss of earnings due to the impairment of the environment.
Moreover, it only allows compensation "for the cost of measures to
247 The current
reinstate the environment contaminated by oil."
trend is to move away from the mindset that damage to the marine
environment cannot be expressed as quantifiable economic loss
Ozqayir, supra note 127. Spanish Royal Decree No. 210/2004, effective on
February 15, 2004, allows Spain's Maritime Administration to establish ports of
safety to give safe haven to ships in danger, although the maritime authority retains the discretion to authorize access to these sites. See Brett Allan King, Spanish
Decrees Require Contingency Plans For Oil Spills, Set Up Vessel Tracking System, 27
Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 135, 136 (Feb. 25, 2004).
243 Id.
244 "New tasks include [overseeing] national safety inspections of ships and
port facilities, monitoring classification societies, and assessing third-country
training standards of seafarers .... " Arthur Rogers, EU Parliament Votes to Boost
Compensation,Expand Authority of Maritime Safety Agency, 27 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA)
No. 4, at 132, 133 (Feb. 25, 2004).
245 Id.
246 EU Parliament Endorses Recommendations From Inquiry Into Prestige Tanker
Disaster,27 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 344, 345 (May 5, 2004).
247 CHAO, supra note 224, at 370.
242
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worthy of monetary compensation. 248 In fact, the recent cases of
the second Antonio Gramsci,249 the Patmos,250 and the Haven 251 indicate that national courts are growing increasingly receptive to
reading purely environmental pollution damage well within the
ambit of "pollution damage" and recognizing such damage as admissible claims. "As long as the Conventions exclude environmental damage from the notion of 'pollution damage,' the lacunae
will naturally be filled by domestic laws," and efforts to unify international law on the subject will be futile.252 Efforts to recognize
damage to the environment and biodiversity as quantifiable pollution damage will likely be furthered by expanded access to European courts to challenge alleged violations of EU environmental
253
law.
248 This is the position taken by the IOPC Fund Assembly in adopting Resolution No. 3 after assessing the admissibility of claims in Soviet Courts for compensation for ecological damage made by the U.S.S.R. Government following the 1979
Antonio Gramsci incident. Resolution No. 3 declared that "'the assessment of
compensation to be paid by the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund is
not to be made on the basis of an abstract quantification of damage calculated in
accordance with theoretical models.'" Id. at 362 (quoting Resolution No. 3 "Pollution Damage" (Oct. 1980) (F.D., FUND/A/ES/1/13)). See also Mans Jacobsson,
The InternationalConventions on Liability and Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage
and the Activities of the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, in LIABILITY

FOR DAMAGE TO THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT

39, 53 (Colin M. De La Rue ed., 1993)

(stating "[any calculation of the damage suffered [by the marine environment] in
monetary terms will by necessity be arbitrary").
249 The "U.S.S.R.-registered tanker, went aground on February 6, 1987 off the
southern coast of Finland." CHAO, supra note 224, at 365-66. The Soviet claim included ecological damages measured by a "metodika" formula, which the Court
of Riga may have entertained, but the IOPC refrained from intervening and the
matter was settled out of court. Id.
250 The Greek tanker collided on March 21, 1985 with an unladen tanker in
the Straits of Messina, Italy. The Court of Appeal "granted the Italian State compensation of Lit. 2,100 million for damage to the marine environment ...,"which
included damage to plankton and benthos as the claim was for "damage to the
environment in terms of loss of enjoyment suffered by the community." Id. at 367.
251 The Cypriot-registered tanker caught fire and sank near the Italian coastline after a series of explosions. "[Alpproximately 1,300 Italian claimants, including the Italian Government and the Region of Liguria ...claimed an amount of
£93 million under the head of damage to the marine environment." Id. at 368.
252

Id. at 371.

The European Commission has proposed giving EU citizens and environmental organizations the right to file legal cases in the European Court of Justice and national courts to challenge alleged violations of EU environmental law.
See Joe Kirwin, Proposed EU Law to Expand Access to Courts on Environmental Issues,
26 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 1075, 1076 (Nov. 5, 2003) ("Environmental
Commissioner Margot Wallstrom told reporters ... that the legislation would
help... improve enforcement of EU environmental law.").
253
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Finally, it is absolutely imperative that the available compensation funds be increased, and that a third tier of compensation is
added to the current compensation scheme. The European Commission has proposed increasing available funds fifty percent, providing a total of SDR300 million, and creating a third tier fund,
COPE, with a El billion ceiling.2m Both the Erika and the Prestige
have demonstrated that such disasters can be very costly, often exceeding the available compensation funds. If the international
community continues to resist adopting ERIKA II and its proposal
for an additional compensation fund,2 55 then it is probably advisable that the EC consider creating and implementing its own European liability and compensation regulatory regime for its member
states. 256
In the interests of protecting the marine environment, member
state economies, and the well-being of all its citizens, the EC must
learn from its past mistakes to become a tough regulatory actor
willing to upset the oil shipping industry and opponents, who fear
oil shortages and retaliatory measures. Until then, the cry of
"Nunca Mais!," wherever it is heard, will remain nothing but an
empty slogan of passionate frustration, naive hope, and, ultimately, justified fear.

254 This would bring the international compensation fund more in line with
the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund established under federal laws in the United
States. Id. Cf.Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, 26 U.S.C. § 9509 (2002) (setting the
maximum amount to be paid from the Fund to C1 billion per single incident). The
European Parliament authorized member states to ratify a 2003 agreement increasing the maximum amount payable from the IOPC Fund for any one incident
to SDR750 million, or just over $1.14 billion. See Rogers, supranote 244.
255 For a more detailed look at the European Parliament's proposal, see Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Environmental Liability with regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental
Damage, 2002 O.J. (C 151 E) 132 (suggesting a "polluter pays" principle and setting out definitions of compensable environmental damage); COPE Resolution,
supra note 193 (calling for an additional European compensation fund).
256 The European Parliament and the European Council have adopted the
creation of such a fund, entitled The European Union Solidarity Fund ("EU
Fund"), to show financial solidarity with European regions struck by disasters.
The EU Fund will have an annual ceiling of E1 billion. See Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2003, 2003 O.J. (L 290) 40 (mobilizing the European Union Solidarity Fund for environmental damages including
those of the Prestige oil tanker).
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